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Abstract 
There is a sizeable economic literature dedicated to understanding trust and the extent to 
which it influences decision making. Although trust is difficult to measure, experimental 
economics has commonly used the ‘amount sent’ in the Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) 
investment game to elicit levels of trust from players of the game. However, there is a growing 
body of literature suggesting that factors such as risk preferences, altruism, and subjective 
beliefs may confound this measure of trust, thereby questioning the validity of using the 
‘amount sent’ to elicit people’s levels of trust. To understand these factors, we designed and 
conducted an incentive-compatible economic experiment with students from the University of 
Cape Town. These participants completed the investment game, the dictator game (to measure 
levels of altruism), and a random lottery pair risk preferences task (to gauge risk preferences). 
We also included an information treatment where students were shown the conditional 
distributions of amount sent decisions made by students in the previous, baseline treatment. 
This was done to evaluate whether knowledge of the actions taken by other students would 
ground students’ beliefs and influence the decisions they made. We estimate a set of standard 
statistical models to gauge determinants of the amount sent and a complementary maximum 
likelihood estimation approach to estimate Expected Utility models and Rank-Dependent 
Utility models in order to further evaluate our data. Our results show that caution needs to be 
taken when using the amount sent as a measure of trust as the relationship between risk 
preferences and the amount sent is a nuanced one. Moreover, altruism has a statistically 
significant association with the amount sent and with risk preferences. We also found that those 
who were part of the information treatment sent significantly more than those who were not, 
and they were on average also less risk averse. This indicates that while subjective beliefs do 
influence behaviour in the investment game, they also affect risk preferences. Thus, our results 
suggest that researchers should not use the amount sent in the investment game as a pure 
measure of trust because its measurement is confounded empirically by altruism and subjective 
beliefs, and theoretically by risk preferences. 
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1. Introduction 
Trust among individuals, communities, organisations, and governments is an important 
cultural characteristic that allows members of society to cooperate with each other and enhance 
general welfare (Fukuyama, 1995a; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). From an economic perspective, 
there are a multitude of benefits that can be derived from increased levels of trust within 
society. These include, but are not limited to: increased efficiency and lower costs, improved 
behaviour patterns, higher per capita GDP, better quality government organisations, lower 
levels of corruption, and improved financial development (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Almost 
all economic activity occurring in a country is conducted through organisations rather than by 
individuals acting on their own, which means that high degrees of cooperation are needed to 
keep the economy running efficiently. According to Gambetta (2000), trusting someone is 
engaging in cooperation with them because their actions have a high probability of being 
sufficiently beneficial, or at least not detrimental. It can therefore be said that higher levels of 
trust result in increased levels of cooperation and improved economic outcomes (Fukuyama, 
1995a; Johnson & Mislin, 2011).  
As an abstract concept, trust is difficult to measure and opinions differ on the most effective 
way to measure it. In economics, lab experiments have become the predominant method of 
trust elicitation. The investment game developed by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995, 
henceforth BDM) is the most common experiment used for this purpose. In this game two 
players are randomly paired but separated from each other, for example, they could be located 
in different rooms. Each player is endowed with $10. Player 1 is asked to decide how much of 
their $10 they wish to send, in $1 increments, to player 2. They are informed that any amount 
sent will be tripled before reaching player 2. This send decision is the variable used to measure 
the participant’s level of trust. Upon receiving triple the amount sent by player 1, player 2 is 
asked to decide what proportion of this received amount they would like to return to player 1. 
The amount returned is the variable often used to measure trustworthiness.   
Our focus is limited to the amount sent as a measure of trust; trustworthiness falls beyond 
the scope of this study and will not be considered further. The amount sent in the investment 
game is not, however, a pure measure of trust. There are a variety of factors that have the 
potential to confound it. These include: risk preferences, altruism and subjective beliefs. In 
recent studies, the investment game has been conducted together with additional games and/or 
tasks that measure some or all of these factors in an attempt to determine which of them are 
associated with the amount sent, and if any have a confounding effect on the variable (Cox, 
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2004; Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Schechter, 2007; Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010; Brülhart & 
Usunier, 2012; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats & Zingales, 2013). These studies have returned mixed 
results, which prompted the research upon which this dissertation is based.  
We designed an incentive compatible experiment that measures all the factors mentioned 
above (risk preferences, altruism, and subjective beliefs) to enable us to evaluate whether or 
not they confound inferences about trust drawn from the amount sent in the investment game. 
Risk preferences were elicited through a 100-choice lottery pair risk preference task; altruism 
was measured through the send decisions made in the dictator game; and subjective beliefs 
were accounted for by including an information treatment that aimed to ground participants’ 
beliefs in the actions taken by fellow students who formed part of the baseline treatment. To 
control for potential order effects, we also varied the order in which participants took part in 
the three tasks. Our goal was to determine if the amount sent in the investment game, after 
controlling for all of the above factors, could be used as a reliable measure of trust, or if a more 
cautious approach needs to be taken when interpreting this variable in relation to levels of trust.   
An in-depth review of the experimental methods that have been used to measure trust from 
an economic perspective is presented in Section 2. Emphasis is placed on the BDM investment 
game and various replications of it. Section 3 details our experimental design and procedures, 
Section 4 provides a break-down of the methods used to analyse the data we gathered through 
our experiments, and Section 5 reports the results from carrying out this data analysis. Lastly, 
Section 6 discusses the implications of these results and draws conclusions.  
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2. Understanding Trust 
Trust has become a widely researched concept partly because of the potential that trusting 
behaviour has for improving the welfare of societies (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Johnson and 
Mislin’s (2011) meta-analysis of BDM’s investment game lists the benefits that can be 
expected when there are high levels of trust between people, including increased efficiency, 
better economic outcomes, higher GDP, and better functioning civil services. These are only a 
few of the potential gains that could be derived from a better understanding of trust and of how 
policies can be altered to maximise trust in society, which is a strong motivation for continuing 
to examine trusting behaviour. 
Fukuyama (1995b:26) defines trust as “…the expectation that arises within a community of 
regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of 
other members of that community…” that results in a better society with increased cooperation. 
Thus, trust is an abstract concept that is not easily quantified. In spite of this, economists are 
still interested in understanding trust and how it influences individuals’ decision-making 
processes (Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010). In order to gain an understanding of trust, it has 
been measured in a variety of ways. Some authors have used the well-known question from the 
World Values Survey: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’ (Sapienza, Toldra-Simats & Zingales, 
2013). Others have used experimental methods to measure trust. Lab experiments have 
revolutionised the way trust is measured (Johnson & Mislin, 2011) 
The majority of the literature on trust has been based on studies conducted in Western 
Europe and North America, which provides further incentive to continue conducting trust 
experiments in other parts of the world (Etang, Fielding & Knowles, 2010). This focus on 
developed countries is problematic from an African perspective because Western Europe and 
North America have particularly high levels of trust while Africa is argued to have below 
average levels of trust (Etang, Fielding & Knowles, 2010). In the few instances where trust 
experiments have been conducted in Africa, results suggest that people are less trusting than 
those taking part in comparable studies in different geographic regions, like North America 
(Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Thus our study, conducted on university students in Cape Town, 
South Africa, will add to an underrepresented area of this growing pool of literature. 
According to economic trust literature, the BDM investment game has become the dominant 
method for measuring trust and trustworthiness. It is also referred to more commonly as the 
trust game (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Johnson and Mislin’s (2011) meta-analysis of trust games 
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shows that there have been multiple replications and variations of BDM’s investment game, 
which highlights its relevance and importance when measuring trust.  
In the BDM investment game, subjects were endowed with a show-up fee of $10 on arrival 
and were split into two different rooms. Subjects in room A, also referred to as trustors, had to 
decide how much, if any, of their $10 endowment they wished to send to a randomly and 
anonymously assigned partner in room B, also referred to as the trustee. They were allowed to 
send money in increments of $1. Any amount they chose to send was tripled before it reached 
their partner. Then, the subjects in room B were asked to decide how much of the amount they 
were sent, if any, they wanted to return to their partners in room A.  
BDM held that in order for trust to have played a role in the exchange between subjects, 
there were three conditions that needed to be met. First, the trustor must be put at risk by placing 
trust in the trustee. In the BDM investment game, the trustor faces risk when they choose to 
send money to their partner who may not send anything back. Second, the decisions the trustee 
makes must benefit their partner at a cost to themselves. This is captured by the trustee choosing 
to send money back to their partner to make their partner better off. Third, following the 
transaction both trustor and trustee are better off than they would have been had the transaction 
not transpired. In the BDM investment game, since the money that the trustor sends is tripled 
before reaching the trustee, both subjects can be made better off than if they chose to send 
nothing.  
Thus, the amount sent in the investment game is used as a measure of trust, while the amount 
returned as a fraction of the amount sent is used as a measure of trustworthiness. The BDM 
investment game is designed to elicit attitudes about trust. Further, BDM’s conditions for trust 
to facilitate an exchange are similar to many definitions of trust. Cox (2004:263) defines trust 
as being “… inherently a matter of the beliefs that one agent has about the behavior of another. 
An action that is trusting of another is one that creates the possibility of mutual benefit, if the 
other person is cooperative, and the risk of loss to oneself if the other person defects.” Gambetta 
(2000) states that trusting a person implicitly means that there is a high enough probability that 
the actions they take will be sufficiently beneficial to allow for cooperation.  
While the importance of understanding trust decisions between economic agents is clear, 
there have been a number of studies that question the validity of the trust measure obtained 
through the BDM investment game (Cox, 2004; Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Schechter, 2007; 
Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010; Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats & 
Zingales, 2013). Following BDM, studies have repeatedly used the amount sent in the 
investment game as a measure of trust. However, there are factors that have the potential to 
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affect the amount participants send, and therefore confound the amount sent as a measure of 
trust. This makes the amount sent a noisy measure of trust for the representative participant 
and is even noisier at the individual level. Therefore, more recent studies of trust have 
investigated these factors, which include risk preferences, altruism, and subjective beliefs to 
gauge the influence they have on the amount sent (Cox, 2004; Eckel & Wilson, 2004; 
Schechter, 2007; Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010; Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; Sapienza, Toldra-
Simats & Zingales, 2013). Steps need to be taken to disentangle these factors from the amount 
sent so that it can be used as a more accurate measure of trusting behaviour. The remainder of 
this literature review will evaluate these potential confounding factors. 
 
 Trust and Risk  
Standard economic theory assumes that people have a fixed utility function applicable to all 
risk situations (BDM; Eckel & Wilson, 2004:457). In Harrison and Rutström’s (2008) review 
of experimental evidence on risk preferences, they find that it is often assumed that people are 
risk neutral or, failing this, have stable levels of risk aversion. They discuss the different 
methods that can be used to elicit a person’s level of risk aversion and show how different 
elicitation methods are suited to different environments (Harrison & Rutström, 2008). In the 
risk and trust literature, two commonly used methods of risk elicitation are the multiple price 
list (MPL) and the random lottery pair (RLP) design. The MPL requires subjects to make a 
sequence of binary lottery choices, where one lottery has a greater degree of risk than the other. 
Subjects are shown the sequence, which generally consists of 10 choices, in its entirety before 
making any decisions (Harrison & Rutström, 2008). The RLP design also requires subjects to 
make a sequence of choices between two lotteries, but they generally have to make more than 
10 choices and they only see one choice at a time (Hey & Orme, 1994; Loomes & Sugden, 
1998; Harrison & Rutström, 2008). 
A reason for studying the relationship between risk and trust is due to the potentially 
confounding influence that risk has on trust (Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010). In terms of the 
investment game, this relationship can be tested by determining whether a person’s risk 
preferences influence their send decisions. For example, a person who is highly risk averse 
might choose to send none of their endowment, regardless of how trusting they are, because 
they do not want to risk getting no money back. To control for this, there have been some 
studies replicating the BDM investment game that have included measures like the number of 
risky choices participants made in various risk tasks as proxies for participants’ risk preferences 
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(Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Schechter, 2007; Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010; Sapienza, Toldra-
Simats & Zingales, 2013).1  
Eckel and Wilson (2004) were the first authors to test for a relationship between risk and 
the amount sent in the investment game. They conducted a series of lab experiments in an 
attempt to measure the relationship between risk preferences and send decisions among 
anonymous subjects. Their experiments included a variation of the BDM investment game with 
three treatments and three measures of risk: two experimental measures and one survey 
measure. In their version of the investment game, first movers were required to send their whole 
endowment of $5, which was doubled when sent, or send nothing at all. Then, second movers, 
who also started with a $5 endowment, could send back any amount in the range of $0 to $10 
in $1.25 increments. They also chose to frame the game in terms of the first mover giving a 
loan and the second mover paying back the loan.  
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this interaction if people are purely self-interested 
is for the first mover to send nothing and for the second mover to return nothing (BDM). Using 
backward induction and assuming the second mover is self-interested, it follows that they will 
keep any amount they are sent from the first mover because sending any amount back to the 
first mover will make them worse off. Recognising this, the first mover will not send any 
amount to the second mover because they know they will receive nothing in return.   
Three treatments were used to vary the amount of information subjects received about their 
partners. The first treatment gave no information about partners aside from informing subjects 
that the person they were paired with was at a different location; the experiments were run in 
two computer labs at two different universities. In the second treatment, subjects were given 
the following information about their partner: gender, favourite colour, whether they liked 
dogs, and whether they liked movies. The third treatment showed subjects a photograph of their 
partner taken on the day of the experiment.  
Analysis of the data showed that participants who took on the role of first mover had high 
levels of trust across all treatments; however, those in the first treatment were most likely to 
make the loan. Eckel and Wilson (2004) take this to mean that the greater social distance 
participants have from their partners, the more likely they are to trust them. This contradicts 
what Fukuyama (1995a) suggested: that people are more likely to trust those with whom they 
interact regularly. The implication here is that trust decreases with social distance (Etang, 
                                                 
1 More studies of the risk-trust confound exist (for example, see: Corcos, Pannequin & Bourgeois-Gironde, 
2012; Fairley et al., 2016; Garapin, Muller & Rahali, 2015), but these studies also find mixed results. 
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Fielding & Knowles, 2010), while Eckel and Wilson’s results suggest the opposite. Although 
participants would have had no interactions with their partners, one might have assumed that 
they would be more trusting of their partners if they knew more information about them.  
To proxy risk preferences, participants completed three different tasks. First, they completed 
the 40-question Zuckerman Sensation-Seeking Scale survey, which measures a participant’s 
desire to take part in risky activities. Each question gives participants a pair of statements about 
risky activities, with one statement condemning the risky action while the other applauds the 
risky action, and asks them to select their preferred option.  
Second, the Holt and Laury (2002, henceforth HL) instrument was used and participants 
made 10 decisions between two lotteries with varying degrees of risk. The HL instrument uses 
the MPL design and gives participants a table listing all 10 choices. The table has two columns: 
Lottery A and Lottery B, and each row represents a choice that the participant needs to make 
between A and B (Harrison & Rutström, 2008). Each lottery has set prizes, with Lottery B 
having more variance in its prizes than Lottery A. At each decision, the lotteries have the same 
probability weighting, for example, a 10% chance of receiving prize 1 and a 90% chance of 
receiving prize 2. This probability weighting is what changes with every decision, while the 
prizes in each lottery remain the same. A risk averse individual is more likely to consistently 
select Lottery A while a less risk averse individual might start by selecting Lottery A but 
quickly switch to selecting Lottery B.  
Finally, participants played a card gamble where they were required to choose between a 
certain amount or a risky gamble that had the same expected value as the certain amount. Eckel 
and Wilson (2004) found that these three risk instruments were only weakly correlated with 
each other, which may indicate that these measures were only weak proxies of underlying risk 
preferences. In addition, none of the instruments were significantly correlated with the amount 
sent in the investment game. This suggests that the choice of how much to send is not a risky 
decision. Even after demographic controls are added to the regression, it still holds that none 
of the risk measures were significantly related to the amount sent.  
Houser, Schunk and Winter (2010, henceforth HSW) continued on a similar path in an effort 
to determine whether trust decisions could be predicted using risk attitudes. HSW raise an 
interesting challenge with regards to understanding the influence risk attitudes have on send 
decisions: deciding how much to send involves strategic uncertainty while risk involves state 
uncertainty. In instances of strategic uncertainty, a person’s outcomes are affected by another 
person’s decisions, while with state uncertainty, a person’s outcomes are influenced by aspects 
outside the control of another person, for example, the roll of a dice. The authors work around 
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these conflicting concepts by collecting individual-level risk data in the lab and creating 
separate trust and risk treatments of the investment game. HSW used the same 10-decision HL 
instrument as Eckel and Wilson (2004) to elicit participants’ risk attitudes.  
They separated their experiment into four treatments: two trust treatments and two risk 
treatments. In the trust treatments, participants were randomly and anonymously paired with 
each other to play one of two variations of the BDM investment game, and were also required 
to complete the HL risk task. These treatments were structured to create strategic uncertainty. 
In the first trust treatment, participants played an exact replication of the BDM investment 
game and received an initial endowment of €5. In the second trust treatment, participants 
played the social history treatment of the BDM investment game (they were given the BDM 
summary statistics of how participants acted in the control treatment) and also received an 
initial endowment of €5.  
In the risk treatments, participants also played the BDM investment game and completed 
the HL risk task, but instead of being paired with one another, they played against a computer. 
In both risk treatments, participants received the same summary statistics that participants in 
the second trust treatment received and were informed that those statistics mirrored the 
computer’s return distribution. These treatments were structured to create state uncertainty. In 
the first risk treatment, participants only played against the computer to determine their own 
payments. In the second risk treatment, participants played against a computer to determine 
their own payment as well as the payment of a passive trustee. The trustee’s payment was 
completely determined by the decisions made by the participant and the computer with which 
the participant interacted. 
Upon analysis of the risk data from the HL task, HSW find that participants classified as 
risk seeking (those who switch before the fourth decision) are statistically significantly more 
likely to send a high amount, but only in the risk treatments where their counterpart is a 
computer. However, HSW find no evidence that the HL risk attitudes have an effect on the 
amount sent in the trust treatments, where participants are paired with each other. HSW do not 
dispute that risk may have an effect on the decision to trust, but instead propose that trusting 
decisions are more complex than their experimental design could accommodate. Their study 
shows that measuring the relationship between the amount sent and risk is a challenging task, 
but an important one. HSW suggest that additional factors, like other-regarding preferences, 
may need to be taken into account when measuring trusting decisions. 
Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and Zingales (2013) also examine the relationship between amount 
sent and risk. In their version of the BDM investment game, participants played as both the 
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first mover and the second mover in a lab experiment. When participants played as the first 
mover, they were endowed with $50, but were not endowed with anything as the second mover. 
First movers were instructed to send any amount of their endowment, in increments of $5, to 
their partner. They were informed that the amount they chose to send would be tripled before 
reaching the second mover. First movers were then asked to report what they believed second 
movers would send back for every possible amount that could have been sent to them. When 
they played as the second mover, participants were asked to indicate what amount they would 
send back to the first mover for every possible amount the first mover could have sent to them. 
This process is referred to as the dual role strategy method because it elicits the second mover’s 
complete plan of action for every amount the first mover can send.  
Through this method, Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and Zingales (2013) are able to gather data 
on how participants behave, as well as how they believe others will act. By asking participants 
to report how they expect fellow students to act when playing as the second mover, they elicit 
participants’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of other students. Then, by asking second movers 
to respond to every possible amount sent, their actual response to all available send options can 
be gauged. Thus, the experimenter can separate out the first mover’s expectations about the 
second mover’s behaviour from the behaviour the second mover exhibits. This method ties in 
well with how the authors think of trust: “…the act of trusting [is] the combination of two 
components: beliefs in other people’s trustworthiness and the specific preferences of the sender 
(risk aversion, inequality aversion, altruism),” (Sapienza, Toldra-Simats & Zingales, 
2013:1314) .    
To measure risk, the authors used an MPL design that was a variation of the HL instrument. 
Participants had to choose between two options 15 times, instead of having to make the usual 
10 decisions. Option A always had a certain payoff of between $50 and $120, which increased 
in increments of $5 with each decision, while Option B involved playing out a lottery paying 
$200 or $0 with equal probability. Highly risk averse participants were expected to always 
choose Option A, the certain amount, while less risk averse individuals should choose Option 
B at least part of the time. In theory, the more risk seeking the individual, the longer they will 
continue to select Option B.  
After analysing their risk data, the authors did find a relationship between risk and amount 
sent: individuals who are less risk averse send more in the investment game. Further, as was 
the case with HSW, Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and Zingales (2013) find that the amount sent in 
the investment game does not only serve as a potential measure of trust, it also measures risk 
attitudes and other-regarding preferences. 
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Studies undertaken in rural areas tend to have more nuanced insights than studies conducted 
with university students in computer labs. For example, a study conducted in the field in Peru 
found that less risk averse individuals sent more in the investment game (Karlan, 2005). These 
types of studies are important to include in any analysis of the literature because they break 
away from the commonly used lab experiments conducted with university students. Schechter 
(2007) is another author who conducts investment game experiments in rural areas, specifically 
15 different villages in Paraguay. She also finds a relationship between risk and amount sent. 
Using the investment game, Schechter (2007) shows that the amount sent is determined both 
by trust and risk aversion. 
Schechter (2007) used the original BDM investment game as her measure of trust and a 
variation of it to measure risk. All participants played the risk game first in which they were 
required to make an investment decision (as is the case in the investment game) but the return 
on their investment was determined by the roll of a die. Following this, they played the 
investment game as both the first and second mover. In this way, Schechter (2007) also used 
the dual role strategy method. However, she noted that previous studies have shown this 
method decreases levels of trust in the game and reduces the likelihood that there may be a 
correlation between trust and altruism.  
Analysis of her data shows that there is a robust relationship between levels of risk aversion 
and the amount sent; as participants increase the amount they bet in the risk task, so too do they 
increase the amount they send in the investment game. Further, as is the case with most studies, 
Schechter (2007) finds that women are more risk averse than men. She also finds that they are 
less trusting until she controls for risk aversion, at which point it becomes evident that levels 
of trust are not significantly different. Wealthier participants are less risk averse and more 
trusting until risk preferences are accounted for, at which point levels of wealth have no 
significant effect on degrees of trust. Regardless of how Schechter (2007) analysed her results, 
risk attitudes remain a strong predictor of the amount sent in the investment game. Thus, she 
recommends that before considering the factors affecting trust, risk attitudes need to be 
controlled for. 
From the above analysis, it is clear that there are mixed findings with regard to the influence 
that risk has on how much participants choose to send to their partners. Eckel and Wilson 
(2004) found no correlation between the amount sent and participants’ levels of risk aversion. 
Although HSW did find a relationship, they only found one in half of their treatments, and 
were not certain as to whether or not there was a real relationship. Although Schechter (2007) 
found that levels of trust and risk preferences influenced the amount participants sent, her 
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sample is very specific, i.e., villagers in rural Paraguay. However, Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and 
Zingales (2013) found that more risk averse individuals tend to send less in the investment 
game. Further, they have the largest battery of risk preference questions (15 in total), which 
could indicate that until their study, there was insufficient data gathered on risk attitudes to be 
able to draw accurate inferences about the relationship between risk and trust.  
One common factor that becomes evident from all of these studies is the need to consider 
more than just trust and risk when analysing the investment game. There also seems to be a 
need to analyse participants’ other-regarding preferences. Levels of altruism could influence 
the amount people choose to send, which makes it another factor worth considering.  
 
 Trust and Altruism  
Experimental studies in game theory have typically assumed that players are self-regarding 
and play games with strategies that maximise their own payoffs (Gintis et al., 2005). However, 
it is not only self-regarding preferences that matter: a significant portion of literature has shown 
the importance of other-regarding preferences and how these preferences influence the 
decisions that people make (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000; Cox, 2004; Gintis et al., 2005; 
Schechter, 2007; Dixit, Skeath & Reiley, 2009; Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010; Sapienza, 
Toldra-Simats & Zingales, 2013). The investment game has shown that people do not 
necessarily act solely according to their self-regarding preferences. Further, just as was the case 
with risk preferences, the experimental design does not allow for a distinction to be made 
between decisions based on trust and those based on other-regarding preferences.  
Other-regarding preferences, also referred to as prosocial preferences, are informed by 
norms that are internalised over time as prosocial behaviour and fair-mindedness is learnt 
through experiences and education (Dixit, Skeath & Reiley, 2009). These preferences are 
modelled on positive reciprocity, which is conditional kindness: a generous action in response 
to a generous action from someone else (Cox, 2004). Altruism, on the other hand, is 
unconditional kindness  (Cox, 2004). Send decisions made in the investment game could be 
influenced by positive reciprocity, yet altruism still needs to be accounted for. 
Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and Zingales (2013:1321) argue that considering risk preferences 
in the investment game is not sufficient: these experiments also need to account for other-
regarding preferences. While people do care about their own payoffs, they also seem to care 
about their payoff relative to their partner (Sapienza, Toldra-Simats & Zingales, 2013). This 
realisation meant that studies that followed on from BDM examined other-regarding 
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preferences. However, they tended not to separate altruism and other-regarding preferences out 
from trust and reciprocity (Cox, 2004). This means that these studies cannot be used to draw 
conclusions about which decisions are based on trust and which are based on other-regarding 
preferences or altruism. Being able to make this distinction is important for advancing the 
empirical validity of game theory and the way these interactions are modelled (Cox, 2004). 
To solve this problem of separation, Cox (2004) developed a triadic design: he re-created 
the BDM investment game but incorporated three different treatments. Treatment A followed 
the investment game precisely, including the initial $10 endowment given to both players. 
Treatment B was the dictator game, which was the same as treatment A aside from the fact that 
participants in the second-mover group had no decision to make or opportunity to send 
anything back to the person with whom they were paired. Treatment C used the same structure 
as treatment A, but the first movers were endowed with the amount kept by the first movers in 
treatment A (i.e., the amount not sent) and made no send decisions. The second movers were 
endowed with the original $10 as well as the amount sent to the second movers by the first 
movers in treatment A. The second movers were the ones who made a decision about how 
much to send to the first movers. The dictator game, the game played in treatment B, has often 
been used in experimental economics to examine social preferences and through its various 
applications, it has shown that people can be altruistic and that they do have other-regarding 
preferences in certain situations (List, 2007). 
By analysing the decisions made in the three treatments of the triadic design, Cox (2004) 
was able to separate out decisions made based on altruism and trust or reciprocity. Cox (2004) 
compared the decisions made in treatment A to those made in treatment B to determine if the 
decisions made in treatment A were motivated by trust and altruism. If the first mover sent a 
larger amount to the second mover in treatment A than in treatment B, then the first mover 
showed trust because the amount sent in treatment A cannot fully be explained by other-
regarding preferences. Data from Cox’s (2004) experiment showed that subjects, on average, 
sent more in treatment A than in treatment B. Further, 63% of subjects behaved altruistically, 
which is significant evidence that subjects had unconditional other-regarding preferences, i.e., 
were motivated by unconditional kindness (altruism) rather than reciprocal generosity. These 
factors indicate that trust and altruism both played a role in the decisions made by the first 
movers in treatment A.  
Similarly, if the second mover returned a larger amount in treatment A than in treatment C, 
then the second mover has shown that they are motivated by reciprocity because the amount 
sent in treatment A cannot be fully explained by other-regarding preferences. This is indeed 
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the case: data from Cox’s experiment show that subjects have unconditional other-regarding 
preferences, and 41% of subjects behaved with altruistic or inequality-averse other-regarding 
preferences.   
Brülhart and Usunier (2012) also examine the influence that altruism may have on the 
amount a participant chooses to send. They altered the investment game so that second movers 
were given different endowments: one group was accordingly classified as ‘rich’ while the 
other as ‘poor.’ First movers played simultaneously with both a poor and a rich second mover. 
The authors wanted to determine whether first movers would give more to the poor second 
mover than to the rich second mover. If they did give more to second movers classified as poor, 
this would show signs of altruism in the first mover. It would also prove that trusting someone 
is more than just being selfish and expecting positive reciprocity, it would mean that 
participants gained utility from being kind. 
They also show, as many studies before them had, that there is only a very small fraction of 
people who act according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by sending or returning 
nothing. This shows that the investment game is not best characterised as a game between two 
entirely self-interested players and that selfishness may not be the dominant motivation behind 
the choice of how much to send (Brülhart & Usunier, 2012). However, through their analysis, 
the authors are unable to find altruism to be a statistically significant contributing factor to 
trusting behaviour. 
The investment game uses the amount sent as a means of measuring levels of trust but, 
because of the factors that influence a person’s send decision, it is a noisy measure of trust. 
Theoretically, altruism and trust are not related, but altruism does seem to influence the amount 
individuals choose to send. Thus, it must be accounted for when the amount sent is used to 
calculate trust in the BDM investment game. Another such factor that should be accounted for 
when utilising ‘amount sent’ is a person’s beliefs about how trustworthy others are.   
 
 Trust and Beliefs 
Beliefs are part of the fundamental building blocks of models of uncertainty in economics 
(Hurley & Shogren, 2005). The beliefs people hold inform the way they act and decisions they 
make, including whether or not to trust someone. When people make decisions in a state of 
uncertainty, they generate some subjective estimate or view about how others will act, i.e., they 
form a subjective belief (Dixit, Skeath & Reiley, 2009:96). Eliciting people’s beliefs is a 
complex task but is invaluable in understanding decision-making processes. While choices and 
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actions can be observed by researchers, beliefs are not observable, so studies infer beliefs or 
try to find proxies (Nyarko & Schotter, 2002). In experimental economics, instead of trying to 
elicit participants’ beliefs directly, researchers sometimes use information treatments to ground 
peoples’ beliefs. Participants update the beliefs they held prior to receiving the additional 
information in these treatments to form their posterior beliefs, i.e., beliefs that are updated with 
respect to the new information. 
Providing social history information to participants of the investment game allows them to 
make decisions based on shared information. A social history treatment can result in 
participants internalising social norms and has the potential to increase social identity (BDM). 
Dixit, Skeath and Reiley (2009) suggest that through education and experience children mature 
into adults and selfish tendencies are replaced with fair-mindedness and prosocial behaviour. 
This results in the internalisation of new social norms as well as the fostering of other-regarding 
preferences (Dixit, Skeath & Reiley, 2009). Social history information treatments are suitable 
methods of reminding people of these social norms and ensuring they act in line with the groups 
with whom they identify (BDM).  
There were two treatments in the BDM investment game: the first treatment was the control 
in which the investment game was played exactly as described previously. The second 
treatment was conducted in the same manner as the first treatment except the participants were 
also given information on how those in the control treatment had chosen to act. BDM referred 
to this as a social history treatment; participants were given a summary report of the decisions 
made by those who had completed the same experiment before them. The report comprised of 
a table that showed how many participants sent each amount from $0 to $10, together with the 
average amount returned for each of these send options. The final row of the table showed the 
average profit for each option. Subjects in the social history treatment completed the 
experiments only after receiving this information. 
BDM found an increase in the correlation between the amount sent and amount returned 
when this additional information was provided to participants. It was concluded that using an 
information treatment increased the amount sent in the investment game. HSW used the same 
information treatment in their investment game. However, they found that showing participants 
this additional information had little effect on the send decisions they made. In the study 
conducted by Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and Zingales (2013), they found that beliefs were only 
significantly correlated with the amount sent when participants sent more than 25% of their 
initial endowment. Sending anything less than 25% was considered to be an act of charity and 
was unrelated to participants’ beliefs about how trustworthy their partners were. Thus, a 
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participant’s beliefs have the potential to influence the amount they choose to send in the 
investment game, but it is not certain that beliefs, or additional information, will have a 
significant effect on send decisions.  
 
 Going Forward 
Although there have been a multitude of studies already conducted using the investment 
game, we believe that there is still valuable information to be obtained by doing another one. 
Based on the various definitions of trust used in the experimental economics literature, attitudes 
concerning trust present the same kinds of interactions that would be influenced by risk 
preferences and subjective beliefs. The same is not necessarily the case for the relationship 
between trust and altruism; in theory, there is no reason to believe that these two factors are 
related. However, in reality, it is quite possible that all three of the above factors influence the 
amount sent in the investment game, thereby influencing trust. 
Our study sets out to determine how much impact these factors have on the amount sent 
when they are all measured in a single study. Based on the above literature, we decided to get 
participants to complete the investment game via the dual role strategy method. To elicit risk 
preferences, we move away from using the MPL method of risk attitude elicitation. Instead, 
we use the RLP design and increase the battery of questions to 100 so that we have better 
informed risk attitudes (Harrison & Rutström, 2008). We use a variation of the dictator game 
to measure levels of altruism and see if other-regarding preferences need to be accounted for. 
And finally, we use an information treatment similar to the BDM social history treatment to 
determine whether the presence of more information affects participants’ behaviour.2 If the 
amount sent is influenced by risk preferences, altruism, and/or subjective beliefs, then serious 
caution needs to be exercised when using the amount sent as a measure of trust. 
 
  
                                                 
2 An important difference is that BDM show the distribution of amount returned unconditionally, while we show 
the distributions of the amount returned by player 2 conditional on the amount sent by player 1. 
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3. Experimental Design 
Our experiment was designed to decompose the amount sent in the investment game into 
factors that may affect it. Drawing on the above literature, our intention is to determine the 
extent to which people’s risk attitudes, levels of altruism, and subjective beliefs influence the 
amount sent, and whether these factors confound the measurement of trust. To do this, all 
participants in our experimental sample completed three tasks: the BDM investment game, the 
dictator game (informed by Cox’s (2004) triadic design), and a RLP risk preference task. 
Participants were also divided so that some of them took part in an information treatment. This 
combination of tasks allowed us to elicit risk preferences and altruism, as well as ground 
subjective beliefs. The following section discusses these three tasks, as well as our 
experimental design and our sample, in more detail. 
 
 Experimental Procedure 
We divided our sample of students into two treatment groups: a baseline treatment and an 
information treatment. Regardless of which treatment participants were placed into, each 
individual in our sample completed all three tasks in our experimental design: the investment 
game, the dictator game, and the risk preference task. Every participant also played both roles 
in the investment game, i.e., they played as trustor and trustee.  
Table 3.1: Order Variations 
 First task Second task Third task 
Order 1 
Investment game 
(player 1, player 2) 
Dictator game Risk preference task 
Order 2 
Investment game 
(player 2, player 1) 
Dictator game Risk preference task 
Order 3 Dictator game 
Investment game 
(player 1, player 2) 
Risk preference task 
Order 4 Dictator game 
Investment game 
(player 2, player 1) 
Risk preference task 
 
In our baseline treatment, we varied the order in which these three tasks were completed, as 
well as the order of the participants’ roles. There were four different variations across sessions, 
but each participant completed only one session. Under order 1, participants first played the 
investment game as the trustor/sender (henceforth player 1) and then as the trustee/receiver 
(henceforth player 2), then they played the dictator game, and finally the risk preference task. 
All four order variations we used are shown in Table 3.1. Table A.1 in Appendix A gives a 
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breakdown of all the sessions that were run in the baseline treatment, including information on 
the number of participants and the order in which the tasks were completed for each session. 
For the information treatment, we only used order 2: investment game (player 2, player 1), 
dictator game, risk preference task, and order 4: dictator game, investment game (player 2, 
player 1), risk preference task. We excluded orders 1 and 3 because participants were provided 
with additional information when they assumed the role of player 1 in the investment game and 
we did not want this information to influence the way they behaved as player 2. Thus, they 
always needed to act as player 2 first when they played the investment game in this treatment. 
Table A.2 in Appendix A gives a breakdown of all the sessions that were run in the information 
treatment, including information on number of participants and the order in which the tasks 
were completed for each session. The risk preference task was completed last in both treatments 
for two reasons: there would have been too few people in each group if we had also varied the 
order in which this task was completed; and by running the risk preference task last, we avoided 
priming participants on their risk appetites before completing the investment game.  
The sessions took place on weekdays in the School of Economics computer lab at the 
University of Cape Town (UCT). I assumed the role of experimenter and had two research 
assistants (RAs) to help run the sessions. Prior to the arrival of the participants, we had set up 
the computers to run the three tasks and separated them with partitions to prevent participants 
from seeing each other’s screens. No communication was allowed once they entered the 
computer lab aside from one-on-one interactions with the experimenter or the RAs. Participants 
were asked to sign consent forms, after which they were shown an introductory presentation 
outlining how the session would proceed. This presentation is included in Appendix B1: 
Introductory Presentation. After this presentation, participants read the written instructions for 
the first task. The written instructions for each of the three tasks are included in Appendix B2: 
Written Instructions. These written instructions were followed by audio-visual instructions 
explaining the first task. Once they had been through both sets of instructions, they were 
allowed to complete the first task.  
On completion of the first task, subjects read the second task’s written instructions and 
watched the audio-visual instructions prior to starting the second task. Once a participant had 
completed the second task, they read the written instructions and then watched the audio-visual 
instructions for the third task before starting this task. We developed software for these tasks 
using the oTree framework (Chen, Schonger & Wickens, 2016). These three tasks are outlined 
in detail below. 
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 Investment Game 
In this task, participants played the BDM investment game and were all required to play as 
both player 1 and player 2. The order in which participants played these roles was randomised 
across sessions in the baseline treatment. However, in the information treatment, participants 
always played as player 2 first; the reason for this will be discussed in further detail in Section 
3.2.1 below. Player 1 and player 2 both received an initial endowment of R100. For ease of 
understanding, each role in the investment game will be explained separately below.   
 Investment Game: Player 1 
When taking on the role of player 1, subjects were asked to decide how much, if any, of 
their endowment they wanted to send to their randomly assigned partner, player 2. They were 
only allowed to send amounts in increments of R20 {R0, R20, R40, … R100}. The amount 
they chose to send was then tripled by the experimenter before being received by player 2. 
Player 1 was asked to make this choice five times.  
 
Figure 3.1: Screenshot of Investment Game interface for Player 1 
 
23 
 
Figure 3.1 shows a screenshot of the interface we designed for this task, using the oTree 
framework (Chen, Schonger & Wickens, 2016). We emphasised the player’s role (player 1 in 
the screenshot) and the decision number (1 of 5 in the screenshot), and included brief 
instructions to further cement the subject’s understanding. An example of a possible response 
to the question ‘What amount will you send to Player 2?’ was randomly selected from the set 
of possible responses and provided below the instructions.  It walked participants through the 
process: if player 1 sent s, where 0 ≤ s ≤ 100, player 2 would receive 3s; player 1 would be left 
with R100 – s and player 2 would have R100 + 3s; then player 2 had to decide how much, if 
any, of the 3s to return to player 1. Below this example, participants were asked to indicate 
what amount, from a list of available options, they wanted to send to player 2.  
Once a participant had selected an option, they were shown a detailed breakdown of what 
selecting that option would entail: the amount player 2 would receive, the amount player 1 
would have remaining, and the choice now available to player 2 that would ultimately 
determine player 1’s earnings. In Figure 3.1, R40 was selected and the information mentioned 
above was, therefore, presented to player 1. After selecting an option, participants were 
reminded that this could be the decision chosen for their payment; this was done to encourage 
them to take each decision seriously before submitting their selection.  
 
Figure 3.2: Screenshot of Investment Game interface for Player 1 in Information Treatment; 
includes histogram 
In the information treatment, when a participant selected one of these options, a histogram 
was displayed along with the same information given in the baseline treatment; see Figure 3.2, 
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which shows the distribution of responses when player 1 selects R60 as the amount to send. 
The histograms showed a summary of how the 188 participants in the baseline treatment 
responded to each amount sent, with a different histogram for each of the amounts player 1 
could have sent, for every non-zero amount, i.e., {R20, R40, R60, R80, R100}. The horizontal 
axis shows the range of return options available to player 2, and the bars give a visual 
illustration of the percentage of participants that chose to send back each amount, conditional 
on the amount sent by player 1. Participants in the information treatment knew that the data 
they were seeing were from decisions made by 188 fellow UCT students who had recently 
completed the same task.  
Figure 3.3 is a closer look at one of these histograms showing baseline treatment data; this 
particular histogram shows the percentage of previous responses of the amount sent back by 
player 2 when player 1 sent R80, while the histogram in Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of 
responses when player 1 sent R60. Although we were interested to see whether this new 
information influenced the decisions that participants made when playing as player 1, we did 
not want it to influence the amount that participants sent back as player 2. Therefore, in the 
information treatment, participants always played as player 2 first to ensure they did not see 
these histograms before making their decisions. 
 
Figure 3.3: Histogram for distribution of amount returned by Player 2 when Player 1 sent 
R80 in the Baseline Treatment 
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 Investment Game: Player 2 
In order to elicit the full distribution of player 2 return behaviour for every amount sent, we 
used the dual role strategy method for player 2 return decisions. When subjects took on the role 
of player 2, they were asked to indicate what amount they would send back to player 1 for 
every possible non-zero amount (R20, R40, R60, R80, or R100) they could receive from player 
1. The amount sent was tripled by the experimenter before reaching player 2. 
Figure 3.4 shows a screenshot of the interface for player 2. Again, we emphasised the 
player’s role (player 2 in the screenshot) and the decision number (1 of 5 in the screenshot), 
and included instructions to further cement the subject’s understanding. An example of a 
possible response to the question ‘What amount will you send back to Player 1?’ was selected 
at random from the set of possible responses. The example was displayed below the instructions 
and it highlighted salient aspects of the decision at hand. It took participants through the 
process: assuming player 2 received 3s, then if player 2 sent back r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 3s, player 1 
would earn 100 – s + r and player 2 would earn 100 + 3s – r. Participants were then asked what 
amount they wished to send back and had to select their preferred amount. 
 
Figure 3.4: Screenshot of Investment Game interface for Player 2 
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When a participant selected one of these options, they were shown the final amount that 
each player would earn. After selecting an option, participants were reminded that this could 
be the decision chosen for payment to encourage them to take each decision seriously before 
submitting their selection.   
 
 Dictator Game 
We adopted the first two prongs of Cox’s (2004) three prong triadic design, i.e., the BDM 
investment game and the dictator game. We use this experimental design to allow us to 
disentangle trust from motivations that are not conditional on beliefs about the behaviour of 
other people. In our variation of the dictator game, every participant took on the role of the 
dictator (player 1) and had to make five decisions based on five variations of Cox’s (2004) 
dictator game. These modifications are based on Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) version of the 
dictator game.    
In the first variation, both subjects were endowed with R100. Player 1 was asked to decide 
how much of their endowment to send to player 2 in R10 increments {R0, R10, R20, …, R100}. 
Any amount that player 1 chose to send to player 2 was tripled (multiplier = 3) before reaching 
player 2, at which point the game ended. In each new variation of the game, player 1 was 
always the one making the decisions about how much to send, always in R10 increments, but 
the players’ initial endowments changed, as did the multiplier. In all instances, player 1 kept 
all the money that was not sent to player 2. The five variations of the dictator game that 
participants played, with each variation representing one of the five decisions they were 
required to make, are shown in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2: Dictator Game Variations 
 
Player 1 endowment Player 2 endowment Multiplier 
Variation 1 R100 R100 3 
Variation 2 R100 R0 3 
Variation 3 R100 R100 1 
Variation 4 R100 R0 1 
Variation 5 R80 R0 5 
 
Figure 3.5 shows a screenshot of the interface we designed to carry out this task. We 
emphasised the decision number (1 of 5 in the screenshot), the initial endowment of each player 
(R100 each in the screenshot), and the multiplier (1 in the screenshot). An example of a possible 
response to the question ‘What amount will you send to Player 2?’ was selected at random 
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from the set of possible responses for the given variation. The example was displayed below 
the instructions and it highlighted salient aspects of the decision for the relevant variation. It 
took participants through the process: if player 1 is endowed with x1 and decided to send s, 
where 0 ≤ s ≤ x1, then s is multiplied by m, where m is 1, 3, or 5, depending on the variation 
number. Player 2 would then receive ms. The game would end, and player 1 would earn x1 – s 
while player 2 would earn x2 + ms. Participants were then asked what amount they wished to 
send and were given the full list of available send options. 
 
Figure 3.5: Screenshot of Dictator Game interface for Player 1 
When a participant selected one of these options, they were shown a detailed breakdown of 
what selecting that option would entail for both players. After selecting an option, we reminded 
participants that this could be the decision chosen for payment to encourage them to take each 
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decision seriously before submitting their selection. This game was presented and played in the 
same way for the baseline treatment and the information treatment.  
 
 Risk Preference Task 
The risk preference task, based on Hey and Orme (1994), was used to elicit participants’ 
risk preferences. It presented subjects with a choice between two lotteries on each screen, with 
subjects required to make 100 of these choices in total. The lotteries were displayed as pie 
charts with accompanying text that listed the probabilities of the prizes in terms of numbers on 
a 6-sided die and participants were required to choose one lottery on each screen. The lottery 
pairs in the task were based on the set developed by Wilcox (2018).  
 
Figure 3.6: Screenshot of Risk Preference Task interface 
Figure 3.6 shows a screenshot of the interface we designed to carry out this task. We 
indicated the decision number (1 of 100 in the screenshot) and gave a visual representation of 
the two lotteries that participants had to choose between for each decision. The pie chart 
segments were different colours to help participants discriminate between the various 
probabilities and amounts. Descriptions accompanied the pie charts to further clarify the prizes 
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and probabilities of winning for each of the lotteries. When a participant selected one of the 
lotteries, the background of the pie chart for that lottery was highlighted. An additional line of 
text appeared below the lottery text confirming that it had been selected; as indicated for 
Lottery A in Figure 3.6. This game was presented and played in the same way for both the 
baseline and information treatment. 
 Figure 3.7 shows three Marschak-Machina Triangles (see Machina, 1987), which capture 
the three different contexts (i.e., prizes) of the lotteries that the participants needed to choose 
between. In these triangles, the vertical axis represents the probability of the highest prize 
(pHigh) in a lottery, while the horizontal axis represents the probability of the lowest prize 
(pLow) in a lottery, i.e., in the first triangle, the vertical axis represents the probability of getting 
R230, while the horizontal axis represents the probability of getting R80 from the lottery. The 
probability of getting the medium prize (pMed) in a lottery is determined by subtracting the 
probability of the highest prize and the probability of the low prize from one; i.e., pMed = 1 – 
pHigh – pLow.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: MM Triangles of Risk Preference Task Lotteries 
Each point in the Marschak-Machina Triangles represents a lottery, while the line 
connecting points represents a lottery pair (if two points are connected) or a set of lottery pairs 
(if more than two points are connected). One of the lotteries in each pair presented to 
participants is always riskier. A riskier lottery is one in which there is a higher probability 
weighting on the extreme prizes, i.e., participants are more likely to get either the best outcome 
or the worst outcome and are less likely to get the medium outcome. In terms of a Marschak-
Machina Triangle, moving in a north-easterly direction assigns more probability weight to the 
Given the set of outcomes 
A = {R80, R180, R230} 
 
11 lottery pairs 
Given the set of outcomes 
A = {R80, R180, R580} 
 
17 lottery pairs 
Given the set of outcomes 
A = {R180, R230, R580} 
 
15 lottery pairs 
pLow = p(R80)  
pMed = p(R180) 
pHigh = p(R230) 
pLow = p(R80)  
pMed = p(R180) 
pHigh = p(R580) 
pLow = p(R180)  
pMed = p(R230) 
pHigh = p(R580) 
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high and low prizes, and less to the middle prize, which implies that a lottery which is north-
east of another is riskier.  
Collectively, the three triangles in Figure 3.7 show the set of 43 unique lottery pairs in the 
Wilcox (2018) design, which are the same pairs we used in our experiment. Wilcox (2018) 
constrained this lottery set in five ways: (1) each pair needed to fall within a three outcome 
Marschak-Machina triangle and needed to show an interesting risk trade-off without being too 
complex; (2) probabilities of outcomes needed to be multiples of one-sixth to enable subjects 
to roll a 6-sided die, which is familiar, while still maintaining a theoretically relevant collection 
of probabilities; (3) only four different outcomes were used across all the pairs to ensure some 
diversity in risk trade-offs but also to bound the number of utility parameters that can be 
estimated; (4) repetition of the 43 pairs was allowed but not more than once every 20 pairs to 
ensure that subjects would be slow to recognise repeated pairs; and (5) participants would be 
required to make decisions between 100 lottery pairs, which should be a large enough decision 
set to give results power, but not so large that participants lose attention. 
 
 Experimental Sample 
The sample of 282 participants used for these experiments was drawn from UCT students. 
A recruitment email that gave a brief overview of the study together with expected earnings 
for participating was sent out to all students through UCT’s central mailing list. Those who 
were interested in participating in the study were asked to complete a nine-question survey to 
allow the gathering of basic demographic information. Over 1000 students responded to the 
recruitment email. Any students who declined to answer the survey, who omitted any 
information, or who were slow to respond (those who responded more than two days after the 
recruitment email was sent out) were excluded from the sample. This left 759 eligible 
respondents.   
From this remaining student pool, two random samples of subjects were drawn to participate 
in the two different treatments of the experiment. The first sample consisted of 290 students 
who were invited to participate in the baseline treatment. The second sample was made up of 
250 students who were invited to participate in the information treatment. The first sample was 
added to a dedicated site on UCT’s virtual learning environment that allowed participants to 
sign up for a session at a time that suited them. An announcement was sent out to these students 
providing more information about the study, including the expected amount of time needed to 
complete a session and anticipated payment amounts, together with a weblink to the site 
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mentioned above to allow the students to sign up for the session of their choice. An SMS 
reminder was sent to the participants the evening before and on the morning of each session. 
Once the initial 188 participants had completed the baseline treatment sessions, the second 
sample of subjects was added to the website to facilitate their signing up for the information 
treatment sessions.  
 Payment 
To promote incentive compatibility, the study was designed so that participants received 
real monetary rewards for the decisions they made. However, they were only paid for two of 
the three tasks they completed, and for one of the decisions in each task. The experiment was 
designed so that upon completion of the three tasks, participants were randomly paired with 
another student in their session. In their pairs, participants were paid either for the investment 
game or the dictator game, which was randomly decided. Additionally, they were only paid for 
one decision that they made as either player 1 or player 2 within the chosen game. Thus, the 
game, the role, the decision, and the partner were all randomly selected for each participant in 
order to determine their payment. 
In the scenario where the investment game was chosen for payment, one participant would 
be randomly assigned the role of player 1 and another player 2 and each would receive an initial 
endowment of R100, denoted by x. As player 1, each participant was required to make five 
send decisions. Thus, one of these send decisions (denoted by s, where 0 ≤ s ≤ 100) that the 
participant made would be selected to play out. This chosen send amount, s, would then be 
tripled, and the person assigned the role of player 2 would receive 3s. The amount player 2 
reported they would return (denoted by r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 3s) when receiving 3s, would be sent 
back to player 1. This resulted in player 1 earning (x – s) + r and player 2 earning x + (3s – r).  
The same logic applies to the payment criteria for the dictator game. However, there are also 
variations across the decisions, as described in Table 3.2, that need to be considered. The 
endowment amount, x, differed for the players across decisions and roles (denoted by x1 for 
player 1 and x2 for player 2), and instead of the amount sent, s, always being tripled, it was 
multiplied by various multipliers, m. Additionally, the participant assigned to the role of player 
2 had no decisions to make. This resulted in player 1 earning (x1 – s) and player 2 earning (x2 
+ ms). Information regarding these payment calculations was displayed on each participant’s 
computer screen at the end of the experiment. 
We designed the experiment so that the decisions that participants made were directly linked 
to the outcomes of the games they played, and thus to the payments they would receive. A 
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significant amount of time was spent on the written and audio-visual instructions, as well as on 
the way the task interface was designed, to ensure participants had a clear understanding of the 
choices they needed to make and how their choices would ultimately affect outcomes of the 
games. The reason we paid participants for either the investment game or the dictator game 
and not for both was to encourage participants to respond according to their preferences in both 
games. We were concerned that participant behaviour would be confounded if we paid 
participants for a decision from both games. For example, a participant might express their 
preferences through their choices in the investment game and be content in the payment they 
expect to get from the decisions they made. Then, when playing the dictator game, they may 
act more altruistically because they have already secured a satisfactory payment in the previous 
game. The reverse could also apply, making participants less altruistic. Thus, because the 
games are so similar, data are likely to be more accurate if only one of the games is played out 
for payment.  
Payment for the risk preference task was less complex, and required the individuals’ 
participation. After completing the risk preference task, we randomly selected one of the 100 
lottery pair decisions they had made by getting the participant to roll two 10-sided dice. The 
numbers they rolled were added together to select a number that corresponded to one of their 
100 decisions. The selected decision was brought up on the participant’s computer screen and 
it displayed the lottery pair and showed whether they had selected Lottery A or Lottery B. We 
then played out the selected lottery by getting the participant to roll a 6-sided die to randomly 
select a number between 1 and 6, which was calibrated to the probabilities in the selected 
lottery. The number rolled determined the amount of money the participant received from their 
chosen lottery. 
Payment for the risk preference task and the investment or dictator game was recorded on a 
payment receipt, which was then taken to a cordoned off and private area where I calculated 
the total earnings for each individual. The earnings consisted of the R40 participation fee, 
payment for the risk preference task, and payment for the investment or dictator game. Payment 
was calculated and placed into an envelope before being given to the participant. Upon 
receiving their payment, participants were required to count their earnings before signing a 
payment receipt confirming that they had been given the correct amount prior to leaving the 
session.  
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 Questionnaire  
After participants had completed the three tasks and payment had been determined, they 
were required to complete a questionnaire in order to elicit basic demographic information and 
opinions about trust from them. While they completed the questionnaire, their earnings were 
calculated, as discussed above, and placed in an envelope, which was taken to them once they 
had completed the questionnaire.  
 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for the sample of 282 UCT students. The average age 
in the sample was approximately 21 years old, while the average reported income was 
approximately R2421 per month. The sample was 59% female, 13% of the sample was White3, 
and one third of the sample was part of the information treatment. Task orders 1 and 3 
constituted 16% and 15% of the sample, respectively, while task orders 2 and 4 were 
approximately one third of the sample each.4  
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age (years) 21.18 2.55 18 39 
Income (Rands) 422.34 187.32 130 980 
Variable Percentage of Sample 
Gender     
Female 59.22% 
Race  
White 13.48% 
Treatment    
Information 33.33% 
Task Order    
Order 1 16.31% 
Order 2 33.33% 
Order 3 14.89% 
Order 4 35.46% 
 
The average earnings across the investment game and the dictator game was R118, while 
the average earnings from the risk preference task was R264. The average total earnings, 
including the R40 participation fee, was R422. The minimum amount that participants earned 
was R130, and the maximum amount was R980.  
                                                 
3 Race was not the focus of this study, which is why White was chosen as the control. The remainder of the 
sample was made up of 57% African, 16% Coloured, 12% Indian, and 1% classified themselves as Other. 
4 Task order 2 and task order 4 constitute a greater proportion of the sample because these were the only order 
variations used in the information treatment as participants had to play the investment game as player 2 before 
receiving information on return distributions from the baseline treatment.  
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4. Statistical Method 
In this study, we use two complementary approaches for data analysis: a standard statistical 
approach as well as a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach. The models we use 
within these approaches aim primarily to identify whether the amount sent in the investment 
game can be used as a pure, unconfounded measure of trust. To test for this, we estimate 
multiple models and vary the independent variables, specifically the number of risky choices 
in the risk preference task, the amount sent in the investment game, the amount sent in the 
dictator game, demographic characteristics, and task parameters. The task parameters include 
which treatment the participants were put into (baseline or information treatment) and the order 
in which participants completed the tasks.  
Our standard statistical approach includes Fractional Response, Tobit, and Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) models. When using the MLE approach, we estimate Expected Utility (EU) 
theory as well as Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) theory models. Both the standard statistical 
models as well as the MLE models will be discussed in detail below.  
 
 Standard Statistical Models 
In our standard statistical models, we focus on finding the marginal effects that various 
explanatory variables have on the amount sent in the investment game. It is common practice 
to use the amount sent as the dependent variable i.e., the variable on the left-hand side of the 
regression (Johnson & Mislin, 2011:873). In the Fractional Response model, we run fractional 
regressions on the proportion of the amount sent with discrete values between 0 and 1. We 
condition the estimates on the number of risky choices made in the risk preference task (which 
is a discrete variable), the amount sent in the dictator game, demographic characteristics, and 
task parameters. The Tobit model, used to model corner solution dependent variables 
(Wooldridge, 2013), conditions the estimates on the number of risky choices made in the risk 
preference task, the amount sent in the dictator game, demographic characteristics, and task 
parameters. In the OLS model, we minimise the residual sum of squares of a linear model of 
amount sent in the investment game, which is regressed on the number of risky choices in the 
risk preference task, the amount sent in the dictator game, demographic characteristics, and 
task parameters.  
By conditioning the amount sent in the investment game on the number of risky choices that 
participants make, we can test to see if number of risky choices has a confounding effect on 
the amount sent. We expect to find a relationship between these two variables because the 
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choice of an amount to send is an inherently risky decision. Similarly, by adjusting for the 
amount sent in the dictator game, we can determine whether or not altruism influences the 
amount sent in the investment game. We also expect to find a relationship between these two 
variables because people often exhibit other-regarding preferences.  
The information treatment variable is included to evaluate the effect of having additional 
information when making a send decision. Again, we expect to find an association between 
exposure to information and the amount sent because this would imply that subjective beliefs 
have some degree of influence over the decisions that participants make. Finally, the task order 
variable is used to control for potential order effects. 
 
 Structural Models of Choice Under Risk 
MLE is a method for finding the parameter values of some model that maximise the 
probability (likelihood) that the observed data would have been produced by that model. In the 
risk-trust literature, MLE can be used to estimate utility functions based on lottery choices in 
the risk preference task. Maximum likelihood is beneficial in the context of this study because 
it uses all the information obtained from the choices made in the risk preference task to estimate 
utility function parameters. This information includes the prizes and probabilities for each 
lottery, as well as which lottery was chosen, for each of the 100 lottery pairs. This measure of 
risk preferences is superior to the discrete variable used in the standard statistical models.   
Our estimation strategy is closely linked to Andersen et al. (2008) and Harrison and 
Rutström (2008), and is discussed below. There are many different forms that a theory of choice 
under risk can take, but our focus will be on the EU and RDU forms. 
 Expected Utility Theory 
Under EU, the probabilities assigned to the different prizes are used to weight the utilities 
of each prize. Then, all of these probability weighted utilities are summed to derive the 
expected utility of the lottery. In the EU form, the value participants assign to a lottery is a 
probability weighted average of the utilities they would assign to the outcomes of the lotteries 
if the outcomes were certain.  
People have preferences over uncertain choices, which we represent with expected utilities 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995). Since preferences do not really exist, we use latent 
preferences that are revealed through choice behaviour. Economists then represent these latent 
preferences through utility functions. Utility functions are abstract and make use of arbitrary 
numerical values to represent preference orderings. Assuming that participants only care about 
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the final distribution of outcomes and that their preferences are complete, transitive and 
continuous, then if they prefer one outcome to another, the outcome they prefer should be 
assigned a higher value by their utility function (Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995). This 
implies that their utility function will represent their preferences.  
We want to estimate the parameters of a utility function that maximise the likelihood of 
observing the choices made in the risk preference task. To do this, we need to assign some 
parametric structure to the problem and we use a power utility function. Assume that utility of 
income is defined by a power utility function that displays constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA): 
U(y) = {
  y r         if  r > 0
ln(y)       if  r = 0
– y r         if  r < 0
(1)
where y is the lottery prize in the risk preference task and r is the parameter to be estimated. 
Relative risk aversion of the utility function is defined by the constant r, which determines the 
shape of the utility function. The EU form is defined as follows:  
EUj = ∑ [pi(yi) ∙ U(yi)]i = 1,2,3  (2) 
where y
i
 is the lottery outcome, p
i
(y
i
) is the probability associated with each outcome y
i
 in the 
choice set, and U(y
i
) is the utility of outcome y
i
.  
Under EU theory, if r > 1 the utility function is convex, which indicates risk seeking 
behaviour. If r = 1 the utility function is linear, implying risk neutrality. If r < 1 the utility 
function is concave, which indicates risk averse behaviour. To estimate r, the expected utility 
of each lottery pair is calculated for an initial estimate of r. A latent index ∇EU, based on latent 
preferences, that captures the difference in expected utility of the Right lottery (Lottery B) and 
Left lottery (Lottery A) is generated where:  
∇EU = EUR − EUL (3) 
This index is linked to a participant’s binary choices (selecting either the Left or Right 
lottery) through a cumulative distribution function, which transforms the range of ∇EU from 
(– ∞,∞) to (0,1). This distribution function, given the value of the latent index, determines the 
probability of choosing the Left lottery and therefore also the probability of selecting the Right 
lottery, for each observation in the dataset.  
The MLE method is then used to determine the value of r that maximises the likelihood of 
observing all the data from the experiment with the following equation: r = r0 + rβ ∙ X, where 
r is the risk preference parameter, r0 is a fixed parameter, X is a vector of demographic 
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characteristics (i.e., age, gender, race), and  rβ is the coefficient vector linked to the 𝑋 vector. 
Thus, following Harrison and Rutström (2008), we make the relevant parameters linear 
functions of observable characteristics. This can be extended by including the amount sent in 
the investment game, 𝐼, together with the other explanatory variables: 
r = r0 + rI ∙ I + rβ ∙ X (4) 
where rI measures the marginal effect of the amount sent in the investment game on estimates 
of r. The risk preference parameter r can now be used to determine whether there is a significant 
relationship between risk preferences and the amount sent, as well as between risk and the other 
potentially confounding factors previously mentioned: altruism and subjective beliefs. 
The model can be further extended by adopting Wilcox’s (2011) ‘contextual utility’ 
behavioural error specification to allow both for mistakes that participants may make and for 
robust inferences. The ∇EU index is normalised by 𝜆 into the [0,1] interval, while the 
behavioural error term 𝜇, from Fechner (1966), makes the ∇EU index smaller as subjects 
become increasingly likely to make errors. Thus, the ∇EU index becomes:  
∇EU = 
[ 
𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝐸𝑈𝐿
𝜆
 ]
μ
 (5) 
However, despite the above considerations and extensions, the literature suggests that EU 
theory may lack descriptive validity. Thus, we include Quiggin’s (1982) RDU theory in our 
data analysis as a robustness test. 
 Rank-Dependent Utility Theory 
RDU theory introduces rank-dependence to EU theory. This means that objective 
probabilities associated with the outcomes of a lottery are transformed into subjective decision 
weights that depend on the participant’s utility ranking of the possible outcomes that are used 
to evaluate lotteries. These decision weights can over- or under-weight objective probabilities. 
Thus, in the RDU model, risk preferences are determined both by the shape of the utility 
function as well as by the probability weighting function (PWF). We need to estimate the 
parameters of a utility function and a PWF that maximise the likelihood of observing the data 
from the experiment. This must to be done in terms of a latent index that captures the difference 
in the rank-dependent utility of the lotteries. The RDU form is defined as follows:  
RDUj = ∑ [wi(yi) ∙ U(yi)]i = 1,2,3  (6) 
with weights wi = π(p1+ p2+ p3) − π(p2+ p3) for i = 1,2 and where wi = π(p3) for i = 3 with 
outcomes ranked from worst to best.  Assuming an RDU model with a power utility function, 
a contextual error specification, and some PWF, the RDU index will be similar to the EU index: 
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∇RDU = 
[ 
𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑅 − 𝑅𝐷𝑈𝐿
𝜆
 ]
μ
 (7) 
A key aspect of RDU estimation is how the PWF is specified. One form is the Power PWF, 
which is similar to the power utility function but replaces prizes with probabilities: 
π(p) = p𝜑 (8) 
The form we use in our analysis is the Prelec (1998) two-parameter PWF: 
π(p) = exp [ − η (− ln p)𝜑] (9) 
for 0 > p > 1, η > 0, and φ > 0. The Prelec PWF is flexible and allows independent specification 
of location and curvature in probability weighting. When η = 1, it nests a Power PWF, and 
when 𝜑 = 1 it nests a one-parameter function, which can be linear, S-shaped, and inverse S-
shaped. RDU theory nests EU theory as a special case. This means that a benefit of using RDU 
estimation is that we are able to determine the curvature of the utility function, as we did under 
EU theory, as well as the shape of the PWF. This combination allows us to separate risk 
preferences into these two components to see if either or both are related to the amount sent in 
the investment game.  
This study combines all of the above methods of data analysis: the standard models 
(Fractional Response, Tobit, and OLS) and MLE models (using EU theory and RDU theory), 
to explore the validity of using the amount sent by participants in our sample as a measure of 
trust. Through our various analytical approaches, our aim is to determine whether risk 
preferences, altruism, and subjective beliefs confound the measurement of trust using the 
amount sent variable.  
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5. Results 
This section starts with a basic overview of the data, followed by a more in-depth look at 
the relationship between the amount sent in the investment game and the variables that have 
the potential to confound its use as a measure of trust: risk preferences, altruism, and subjective 
beliefs. This is achieved by using the two approaches discussed in Section 4: the standard 
statistical approach and the more thorough MLE approach.  
 
 Descriptive Analysis 
An initial analysis of the data shows that, on average and across both treatments, when the 
participants in our sample took on the role of player 1 in the investment game, they sent R50.71, 
or approximately half of their R100 endowment to their partner. The histogram in Figure 5.1 
shows the distribution of the player 1 send decisions for our full sample and accounts for all 
five send decisions that each participant made. 
 
Figure 5.1:Histogram for Distribution of all Five Send Decisions in the Investment Game 
The distribution is only slightly skewed to the left, with 53% of the sample sending between 
R0 and R40. The plurality of the sample, 23% of participants, sent R40 to their partner, while 
the amount sent least often was R0, which was sent by only approximately 10% of the sample. 
In other words, of the 1410 send decisions made in the investment game by all participants 
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across both treatments, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium send decision of R0 was only 
selected 135 times. Further, 73% of the sample sent an amount that fell within one standard 
deviation (R19.03 and R82.39, represented by the vertical dashed lines in Figure 5.1) of the 
mean send amount (represented by the solid vertical line at R50.71 in Figure 5.1). Figure C.1 
in Appendix C shows the distribution of amounts sent in the investment game by the full 
sample, broken down by task order. 
When the data are separated out into the two treatments that subjects participated in, there 
is a slight shift in the distributions of the amounts sent. This is made apparent by the distribution 
of the send decisions in the baseline and information treatments in the histograms shown in 
Figure 5.2. Participants sent an average of R48.28 to their partner when in the baseline 
treatment, while in the information treatment, participants sent an average of R55.57 to their 
partner. The plurality of the sample in the baseline treatment, 24% of participants, sent R40. 
However, in the information treatment the plurality of the sample, 23% of participants, sent 
R100. In both treatments the amount sent least often was R0, which was sent by 11% and 6% 
of the sample, respectively. Thus, it appears that participants who were part of the information 
treatment sent more, on average, than participants who were part of the baseline treatment.  
 
Figure 5.2:Histograms for Distribution of all Five Send Decisions in the Investment Game 
(IG), separated into Baseline and Information Treatment 
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 Standard Statistical Models 
As discussed in the previous section, the three standard statistical models used to analyse 
our data are Fractional Response, Tobit, and OLS. This section draws insights from the results 
obtained when using these models to analyse our data.  
In these models, the amount sent in the investment game is used as the dependent variable. 
There are a variety of ways that the amount sent can be used in our regressions, but our 
preferred specification is to use the amount sent variable that incorporates all five send 
decisions that each participant made in the investment game. In this variation of the amount 
sent, all send-decision data are included in the models and in their subsequent analysis. Table 
5.1 shows the output that results from using this variable in the three standard models.5  
Alternative iterations of the amount sent variable include either using only the first amount 
sent or using the average amount sent. As a robustness check, Appendix D contains the results 
from running the same standard statistical models with these two variations of the amount sent 
variable. Table D.1 shows the results when only the first send decision in the investment game 
is used as the dependent variable, while Table D.2 includes the results when the average of the 
five send decisions is used as the dependent variable. 
The explanatory variable used to control for risk preferences (the number of risky choices 
each participant made) in these models is a simplistic one. It is a discrete variable that discounts 
all risk information aside from the binary choice between the risky lottery and the less risky 
lottery for each of the 100 lottery pairs. Thus, despite being able to include all available send-
decision data from the investment game in our dependent variable, our explanatory risk 
variable only contains the most basic risk preference data from the risk preference task. It is 
therefore plausible that no relationship will be found between the amounts sent and the number 
of risky choices made.   
The amount sent in the dictator game is also included as an explanatory variable. Although 
participants made five send decisions in the dictator game, each decision was a different 
variation of Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) dictator game (see Table 3.2, which contains the 
breakdown of the variations). Because the endowments and multipliers change across each 
variation, we could only use one dictator game send decision. We chose to use the variation 1 
send decision because it follows the design in Cox (2004): each player is endowed with R100 
and the multiplier is 3. The demographic variables we control for are age, race, and gender. 
                                                 
5 Because we use all five send decisions made by each participant, the number of observations (N) in the models 
reported in Table 5.1 is inflated by a factor of 5. This is also the reason that results were clustered at the 
individual level.  
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Other explanatory variables include the binary treatment variable and the task order variable. 
Including the treatment variable gives us insight into whether or not beliefs matter, while the 
task order variable controls for any potential order effects.  
We do not expect to find a linear relationship between the amount sent in the investment 
game and the number of risky choices; in fact, we expect any association between the two to 
be highly non-linear. Since our standard statistical models need to account for this, we include 
quadratic terms for the number of risky choices in our three models. 
Table 5.1: Risk-Trust Confound Estimates for all Five Send Decision in Investment Game 
 Fractional Response Tobit OLS 
  Estimate (Std error) Estimate (Std error) Estimate (Std error) 
Number of risky choices  0.000  0.049  0.039 
  (0.001)  (0.130)  (0.381) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.004***  0.592***  0.412*** 
  (0.001)  (0.090)  (0.055) 
Age  -0.014***  -1.974***  -1.411*** 
  (0.005)  (0.646)  (0.442) 
White  -0.007  -1.176  -0.817 
  (0.047)  (6.755)  (4.675) 
Female  -0.082***  -10.686**  -8.111*** 
  (0.030)  (4.146)  (3.029) 
Information treatment  0.110***  15.000***  11.164*** 
  (0.033)  (4.665)  (3.389) 
Task order 2  -0.091**  -10.946**  -9.399** 
  (0.040)  (5.294)  (4.024) 
Task order 3  0.000  0.958  -0.218 
  (0.046)  (6.397)  (4.696) 
Task order 4  -0.044  -3.450  -4.697 
  (0.042)  (5.808)  (4.228) 
Number of risky choices squared†    0.000 
    (0.004) 
Constant    74.103*** 
    (15.620) 
N  1385  1385  1385 
Marginal effects reported    
Results account for clustering at the individual level   
Standard errors in parentheses    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
† The Fractional Response and the Tobit models report marginal models, so they incorporate the effect of this 
squared term in the estimate of the number of risky choices variable above. 
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Table 5.1 shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between the amount 
sent and the number of risky choices. This confirms that a simple analysis of our data in which 
most of the risk information is lost, is a naive approach. The lotteries in the risk preference task 
have different outcomes and probabilities that participants take into account before making a 
choice. All this information on the properties of the lottery pairs is lost when the only 
consideration is how many risky lotteries were chosen. Even when we incorporate the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship between the number of risky choices and the amount 
sent, there is still no relationship. 
However, these models do show that there is a strong association between the amount sent 
in the investment game and the amount sent in the dictator game. According to all three models, 
an increase in the amount sent in the dictator game results in a statistically significant increase 
in the amount sent in the investment game (p < 0.001 in all models). This strong association 
between these two variables is to be expected. It follows that the amount participants send in 
the investment game is at least partially explained by the amount participants send in the 
dictator game. This initial analysis of the relationship between the send decisions made in these 
games suggests that the amount sent in the investment game is confounded by altruism. 
Being part of the information treatment, as opposed to the baseline treatment, also 
statistically significantly influences the amount sent in the investment game. In the Fractional 
Response model, the information treatment results in participants sending an average of 11% 
more in the investment game. In the Tobit model, participants in the information treatment send 
on average R15 more, ceteris paribus. Similarly, in the OLS model, participants send R11 more 
if they are in the information treatment. All of these effects are significant at the 1% level. This 
shows that beliefs about how other participants will act play an important role in the decision 
of how much to send in the investment game.  
The task order variables show that the order in which tasks were completed does make a 
difference. Participants sent significantly less under task order 2 than they did under task order 
1. A Wald test shows that the amounts sent under task order 2 also differ from the amounts sent 
under task order 3 and are significant at the 5% level in the Fractional Response (p = 0.043) 
and OLS (p = 0.044) models, and at the 10% level in the Tobit model (p = 0.055). None of the 
other task order comparisons, for example, between task order 2 and task order 4, are 
statistically significant (p > 0.109 in all of these comparisons). These differences confirm that 
the order in which participants complete the tasks, as well as the order in which they make send 
and return decisions in the investment game, is significant and therefore important to take into 
account. 
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The amount sent also seems to be affected by some of the demographic variables included 
in the model. The age variable is negative and significant: older participants on average send 
less than their younger counterparts. Similarly, females send significantly less than males, 
ceteris paribus. The difference between male and female send amounts is large and highly 
significant (p < 0.01). On average, according to the Fractional Response model, females send 
8.2% less than males, in the Tobit model, females send R10.69 less than males, and in the OLS 
model they send R8.11 less, ceteris paribus. However, it is possible that at least part of these 
vast differences can be explained by differences in levels of risk aversion between males and 
females.   
While these standard statistical models provide a useful starting point for analysis, there is 
too much information lost from the risk preference task to be able to draw any meaningful 
conclusions from the data about the relationship between the amount sent and risk preferences. 
Therefore, the following section moves away from this method of analysis in favour of using 
structural models that can encompass the risk preference data in detail. 
 
 Structural Models of Choice Under Risk 
A complementary approach to analysing our dataset is through the application of MLE. This 
is a more suitable method of analysing risk preference data because MLE uses all of the 
information about the lottery pairs in its estimations. The results from this framework should 
help establish whether risk preferences confound the measurement of trust or any of the other 
explanatory variables in our sample. Both homogenous and heterogenous preference models 
are used to analyse the data. 
 Homogenous Preferences 
Our study focusses on the canonical model of choice under risk, EU theory, and its extension 
to RDU theory. These theories, together with the power utility function and the Wilcox (2011) 
contextual error specification, generate the Homogenous Preferences model displayed in Table 
5.2. The estimate of the risk preference parameter r is significantly less than 1 under EU theory 
(r = – 0.416) and RDU theory (r = – 0.441), which indicates high levels of risk aversion in the 
sample. Further, the log-likelihoods under both models are essentially the same. This is because 
the two additional PWF parameters, ϕ and η, in the RDU model are not significantly different 
from 1 (p < 0.001 in both cases). This means that there is no evidence of probability weighting 
in our data, implying that EU theory best characterises our data as a whole. In the remainder of 
45 
 
this paper, RDU models only serve as a robustness check because there is very little difference 
between the EU and RDU estimates. 
Table 5.2: Expected Utility and Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates 
Homogenous Preferences 
 Model 1: EU Model 2: RDU 
  Estimate (Std error) Estimate (Std error) 
Power Function Parameter (r)  -0.416***  -0.441*** 
 (0.056)  (0.046) 
PWF Parameter (ϕ)   1.007*** 
   (0.039) 
PWF Parameter (η)   0.980*** 
   (0.025) 
Error (μ)  0.152***  0.151*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
N 28200 28200 
log-likelihood -16143.992 -16143.295 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The lack of probability weighting means that there is very little under- or over-weighting of 
probabilities, depicted in Figure 5.3 where there is only slight evidence of over-weighting.  
 
Figure 5.3: Estimated Prelec PWF for Homogenous Preferences 
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 Heterogenous Preferences 
In order to analyse our detailed risk data as conclusively as possible, our MLE approach and 
its application to EU theory needs to account for observed heterogeneity. This is achieved by 
conditioning our estimates on observed characteristics in the sample. In addition to accounting 
for demographic characteristics, our estimates are also conditioned on the amount sent in the 
investment game, the amount sent in the dictator game, the treatment into which participants 
were assigned, and the order in which they completed the three tasks. However, just as was the 
case with the standard statistical approach, there are a variety of ways to explore the 
relationship between risk preferences and the amount sent in the investment game. Arguably 
the simplest way to analyse these data is to take the first send decision made by participants 
and include it as a covariate in the EU model, as is done in Table 5.3. 
We do not expect to find a linear relationship between the amount sent and the risk 
preferences, which is why we include both linear and quadratic terms for the amount sent 
covariate. From the results in Table 5.3 it is clear that the relationship between the first amount 
sent in the investment game and risk preferences is non-linear and, for the most part, positive. 
This can be interpreted to mean that as the amount sent increases, participants become 
significantly less risk averse (p = 0.032) up to a point. After the turning point, participants 
become increasingly risk averse again. However, because the squared term is so small, most of 
the range of send decisions are associated with lower risk aversion with larger amounts sent. 
These results imply that risk preferences do confound the measure of trust in the investment 
game. Theoretically, this is precisely the relationship that we expect to see: a person who is 
highly risk averse may choose to send very little of their endowment, regardless of how trusting 
they are, because they do not want to risk getting nothing back. Conversely, this also explains 
the behaviour of participants who choose to send large amounts: people who are less risk averse 
are more likely to risk sending larger amounts in the investment game to increase the possibility 
of getting a larger return at the risk of getting nothing. 
Because of the strong association that the amount sent in the dictator game has with the 
amount sent in the investment game in the standard statistical models, we include it in this 
model as a robustness check and to adjust for its potential influence. Again, we only use the 
send decision made in variation 1 of the dictator game, i.e., the send decision with parameters 
that are analogous to those in the investment game. It is also included as a quadratic variable. 
The results show that the amount sent in the dictator game is statistically significant (p < 0.001), 
even more so than the amount sent in the investment game.  
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Table 5.3: Expected Utility ML Estimates for First Amount Sent in Investment Game 
Heterogenous Preferences 
  Estimate (Std error) 
Power function parameter (r)  
First Amount Sent in IG  0.009** 
  (0.004) 
First Amount Sent in IG squared  -0.000*** 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.009*** 
  (0.002) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  -0.000** 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.023** 
  (0.010) 
White  0.148*** 
  (0.032) 
Female  -0.272*** 
  (0.047) 
Information treatment  0.073** 
  (0.029) 
Task order 2  -0.059** 
  (0.026) 
Task order 3  -0.081*** 
  (0.020) 
Task order 4  -0.199*** 
  (0.065) 
Constant  -0.010 
   (0.250) 
Noise  
Error (μ)  0.150*** 
  (0.005) 
N  27700 
log-likelihood  -15755.887 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Theoretically, the amount sent in the dictator game should have no relationship with a 
person’s degree of risk aversion. By definition, there is no risk involved in the decision of how 
much to send in the dictator game. However, there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship in our data. This means that as the amount sent in the dictator game increases, 
participants seemingly become less risk averse. 
Our results also show that providing participants with social history information statistically 
significantly influences risk preferences (p = 0.011). Participants in the information treatment 
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who received information about the distribution of return decisions made by fellow students in 
the baseline treatment are significantly less risk averse than participants in the baseline 
treatment who received no information.  
As was the case with the standard statistical models, we control for order effects using the 
task order variable. Our results show that the order in which participants completed the three 
tasks does matter. Notably, participants who completed the tasks under task order 1 (investment 
game: player 1, investment game: player 2, dictator game, and risk preference task) were 
significantly less risk averse than participants who completed tasks under task order 2, 3, and 
4. Risk preferences between task order 2 and task order 4 were significantly different (p = 
0.063), as were risk preferences between task order 3 and task order 4 (p = 0.078).6  
The demographic characteristics we control for are all significantly related to the estimated 
risk parameter. As participants get older, they become significantly more risk averse (p = 
0.019). Participants who are white are significantly less risk averse (p < 0.001) than participants 
in other racial groups, and, as expected, females are much more risk averse than males at a 
highly significant level (p < 0.001) (Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Schechter, 2007).   
 While these results are all interesting and conform to our theoretical priors, it would not be 
economically sound to limit our analysis to the first send decision in the investment game. As 
per our experimental design, each participant made five send decisions. Thus, another way to 
analyse these data is to stack the data so that all five send decisions can be used in conjunction 
with the 100 lottery choices. The results reported in Table E.1 of Appendix E are generated 
using this stacked variable of the amounts sent as the covariate in the EU model. The same 
explanatory variables are used as those used in Table 5.3, the only difference is the variable for 
the amount sent in the investment game. It is therefore unsurprising that the estimates in Table 
E.1 are similar to those in Table 5.3, except that in the former, most of them are now not 
significant. The only two variables that remain significant are the amount sent in the dictator 
game (p < 0.01) and gender (p < 0.05). Participants show decreasing levels of risk aversion as 
the amount sent in the dictator game increases and females show higher levels of risk aversion 
than males.   
Another variation of the amount sent in the investment game is to use the average of the five 
send decisions. The estimates from using the average amount sent, together with the same 
explanatory variables used in Table 5.3, are reported in Table E.2 in Appendix E. As was the 
case with the stacked variable for the amount sent, the only significant explanatory variables 
                                                 
6 Task order 2 and task order 3 were not statistically significantly different (p = 0.466). 
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in this model of the average amount sent are once again the amount sent in the dictator game 
(p < 0.05), where the level of risk aversion decreases as the amount sent increases, and gender 
(p < 0.05), where females are more risk averse than males. 
In both of these models, the variable used for the amount sent in the investment game is 
included in its quadratic form, as was done with the first amount sent. However, it is not 
significant in either of these models. This means that in instances where either all five or an 
average of the five send decisions are considered, there is no significant relationship between 
the amounts sent in the investment game and the degree of risk aversion in the sample. 
Therefore, although we found a positive and significant relationship between the first amount 
sent in the investment game and the level of risk aversion, this result does not hold when we 
use different variations of the amount sent variable. This implies that the relationship between 
risk and the amount sent is not robust to alternative models that incorporate different definitions 
of the amount sent in the investment game.  
 Although there is no statistically significant evidence of probability weighting in our data, 
the RDU models for each of the variations of the amount sent that were discussed in this section 
are included in Appendix F for the sake of completeness. The RDU estimates for the model 
using the first amount sent in the investment game are presented in Table F.1, the model of the 
stacked variable for all five send decisions is provided in Table F.2, and the model with the 
average of the five send decisions is given in Table F.3. The results from these models are 
robust to the assumption that RDU theory characterises choice under risk. The estimates in 
these models are very similar to the estimates in the comparable EU models, which is not 
surprising given the lack of probability weighting in the data.  
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
It has been clearly established in the literature and confirmed through the analysis of our 
results that eliciting and measuring trust is a complex task. The BDM investment game is 
generally accepted within economics as the best way of measuring trust, which has resulted in 
it being widely studied and replicated over 160 times (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Despite the 
game’s prominence, the underlying question remains as to whether the amount sent in the game 
is an appropriate means of measuring trust. Due to the nature of the send decision, there are a 
variety of factors that have the potential to influence the amount participants choose to send. 
These include risk preferences, altruism, and subjective beliefs. Our study was designed to 
measure each of these factors so that their relationship with the amount sent could be explored 
in more depth. 
We used two complementary approaches to analyse our experimental data: a standard 
statistical approach and an MLE approach. The standard statistical models tested the marginal 
effects of risk preferences (measured as a discrete variable), altruism, and beliefs on the amount 
sent. The models also controlled for various demographic characteristics and task parameters. 
None of the specifications of these models found a significant relationship between the amount 
sent and the number of risky choices made. By contrast, the amount sent in the dictator game, 
which was used to elicit altruism, had a positive and significant influence on the amount sent 
in the investment game across all models and specifications. Similarly, the information 
treatment, which was used to ground subjective beliefs, had a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the amount sent across all specifications and models falling within the 
standard statistical approach.  
 The MLE approach allowed us to use all of the risk preference task data in our analysis, 
rather than relying only on the discrete number of risky choices variable used in the standard 
statistical models. Through the EU and RDU models, we found no significant evidence of 
probability weighting in our sample, which narrowed our focus to only using the curvature of 
the utility function to gauge risk preferences. The amounts sent in the investment and dictator 
games were included as quadratic covariates in these models because of the presumed non-
linear relationship between these amounts and risk preferences. Under one specification of EU, 
we found a positive and significant relationship between the amount sent in the investment 
game and risk preferences, where lower levels of risk aversion were associated with larger 
amounts sent. This only applied up to a point though, after which each additional amount sent 
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was associated with higher levels of risk aversion. However, this result was not robust to the 
various alternative specifications of the amount sent variable.  
We did, however, find a robust relationship between the amount sent in the dictator game 
and risk preferences across all specifications of our EU models. As the amounts participants 
sent in the dictator game increased, this was associated with lower levels of risk aversion. 
Again, because of the quadratic relationship, participants became less risk averse up to a point, 
after which their aversion to risk increased as the amount sent in the dictator game increased. 
The only other explanatory variable that remained statistically significant through the various 
specifications in our MLE approach was gender: females were consistently more risk averse 
than males.  
Some of these results are in line with our expectations, based on existing literature. 
However, other relationships, or lack thereof, were unanticipated. To fully comprehend the 
nuances in our results, it is important to have a complete understanding of how our 
experimental design differed from that reported in the previous literature and how this could 
have impacted our analysis.  
While our study builds on the available experimental literature on measuring trust from an 
economic perspective, it also makes three specific contributions. Firstly, our RLP risk 
preference task had 100 lottery pairs, 43 of which are unique, with a wide range of probabilities 
and prizes. Prior to this, all studies in this literature used MPL risk preference instruments with 
only 15 lottery pairs at most (Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010; 
Sapienza, Toldra-Simats & Zingales, 2013). Our large battery of risk preference questions 
allowed us to elicit more comprehensive risk preference data from our participants. This meant 
that we had the required information to estimate structural risk preference models.  
Secondly, our information treatment was designed so that the additional information 
participants received could be quickly understood and easily interpreted. In the past, 
participants have been given a table with numbers that were difficult and time consuming to 
interpret. Our study presented this information graphically, as shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 
3.3. Participants were shown histograms of the distribution of player 2’s return decisions for 
every possible amount that could be sent by player 1. They were also informed that these 
histograms were constructed using the decisions made by the 188 participants in the baseline 
treatment.  
Lastly, our study appears to have a unique experimental design. As far as we were able to 
discern, no single study has measured all three of the potential confounding factors that ours 
was designed to elicit. Risk preferences, altruism, and subjective beliefs have all been studied 
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with regard to the amount sent in the investment game, but our experimental design allows us 
to elicit these factors and test them independently of one another for any confounding effect 
they may have on the amount sent variable. This means that should a relationship be found 
between any of these factors and the amount sent, their influence can be disentangled from 
trust to get a more precise measure.  
This separation of potential confounding factors to allow the effects of each to be studied 
individually has enabled us to conduct some novel analyses that previous studies have not been 
able to do. One interesting finding is the large and robust relationship between the amount sent 
in the investment game and two of these factors: altruism, measured by the amount sent in the 
dictator game, and beliefs, captured by the information treatment. In our standard statistical 
approach, we showed that the amount sent in the dictator game and the amount sent in the 
investment game were statistically significantly correlated across all models and specifications. 
However, in our dataset, the amount sent in the dictator game is also statistically related to risk 
preferences.  
As discussed in Section 5.3, theoretically there should not be a relationship between these 
two variables. The amount sent in the dictator game is a measure of altruism; there is no risk 
involved in this decision. Prior to this study, altruism and risk preferences had not to our 
knowledge both been measured in the same study and with reference to the amount sent in the 
investment game. Future research should consider replicating this study to see if this 
relationship between altruism and risk preferences is robust.  
Our standard statistical approach also found the amount sent in the investment game to be 
statistically significantly related to the degree of information participants received. Those who 
were part of the information treatment were shown various histograms of the baseline treatment 
distributions of player 2’s return decisions for each amount player 2 could receive. While the 
existing literature is inconclusive regarding the effect of social history information (BDM, 
HSW), this study shows that there is a large and statistically significant relationship between 
providing participants with this information and the amount they send in the investment game. 
It is likely that the extent of this relationship is at least partly attributable to using histograms 
as a means of conveying information. Visual presentations of data are often easier to understand 
and interpret, so it is possible that our way of presenting the information allowed participants 
to better engage with the information they were given.  
These estimates show that beliefs do matter: participants who receive social history 
information and are able to ground their beliefs in the actions that fellow students have taken, 
send more in the investment game. This means that it is likely that beliefs confound the 
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measurement of trust; having more accurate beliefs of how those you play with will likely act, 
tends to increase the amount sent. Beliefs clearly matter, but using an information treatment to 
elicit subjective beliefs may not be the most suitable means of measuring the effect that beliefs 
have on the amount sent. Instead, future studies should consider altering the experimental 
design and using proper scoring rules, like the quadratic scoring rule, instead (Nyarko & 
Schotter, 2002).  
The relationship between the amount sent in the investment game and risk preferences is 
also a complex and nuanced one. A variation of our structural models shows that risk 
preferences do affect the amount sent: as people become less risk averse, they send more in the 
investment game. This relationship is statistically significant and robust, even when controlling 
for demographic characteristics and task parameters. This confirms what the literature has 
already found. However, the only specification of our structural model that found a relationship 
between risk and the amount sent was the variation that used the first send decision. Every 
other model and specification found no significant correlation between risk preferences and the 
amount sent in the investment game.  
Although the relationship between risk preferences and the amount sent in the investment 
game is not robust to different definitions of the amount sent variable, we do find that risk 
confounds measures of trust. The variation in our results could be due to our comprehensive 
measure of risk preferences. No previous studies have gathered as much risk preference 
information with as wide a range of probabilities and prizes. Theoretically, there is a 
relationship between risk preferences and the amount sent in the investment game, which 
means that a more accurate measure of risk preferences should confirm this relationship. 
Clearly more research on this topic is necessary. 
A notable limitation of our study is that our experiments were conducted using university 
students in computer labs. Although this is common practice in many studies in experimental 
economics, students are not necessarily an accurate representation of the population as a whole. 
This means that our results should not merely be extrapolated to the general South African 
population. A distinguishing feature of our study when compared to similar studies that also 
use students, is that ours is conducted in a developing country context. This use of African 
students brings diversity to our results and to the literature that has predominantly focused on 
the developed world.  
One clear conclusion from the above discussion is that research on trust and the amount sent 
in the investment game is fraught with difficulties. While the amount sent should not be 
completely discounted as a measure of trust, its limitations need to be acknowledged. The 
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amount sent is confounded by certain factors, so it should not be used uncritically as a pure 
measure of trust. Instead, researchers using the amount sent in the investment game as a 
measure of trust should recognise that it is influenced by risk preferences, altruism, and 
subjective beliefs.    
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Table A.1: Details of Baseline Treatment Sessions 
Session Date Time Order Number Task Order Number of Subjects 
1 28/08/2018 14:00 1 Is, Ir, D, R* 24 
2 30/08/2018 09:30 3 D, Is, Ir, R 22 
3 31/08/2018 14:00 2 Ir, Is, D, R 16 
4 03/09/2018 14:00 4 D, Ir, Is, R 20 
5 04/09/2018 09:30 1 Is, Ir, D, R 12 
6 04/09/2018 14:00 2 Ir, Is, D, R 18 
7 06/09/2018 09:30 3 D, Is, Ir, R 20 
8 07/09/2018 14:00 4 D, Ir, Is, R 18 
9 18/09/2018 14:00 1 Is, Ir, D, R 10 
10 20/09/2018 09:30 4 D, Ir, Is, R 16 
11 21/09/2018 14:00 2 Ir, Is, D, R 12 
*Is: sender in investment game; Ir: receiver in investment game; D: dictator game; R: risk preference task 
 
Table A.2: Details of Information Treatment Sessions 
Session Date Time Order Number Task Order Number of Subjects 
1 09/10/2018 15:00 2 Ir, Is, D, R* 24 
2 10/10/2018 15:00 4 D, Ir, Is, R 24 
3 11/10/2018 09:30 2 Ir, Is, D, R 24 
4 12/10/2018 14:00 4 D, Ir, Is, R 22 
* Ir: receiver in investment game; Is: sender in investment game; D: dictator game; R: risk preference task 
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B1: Introductory Presentation 
Slide 1 
Introduction
 
Please come inside and find a 
seat with a folder in front of it. 
You may not talk to anyone else 
during this session but if you 
have any questions then just 
raise your hand and either I or 
one of the research assistants 
will come to assist you. 
Hi everyone, my name is 
Tarryn. Thank you very much 
for being here today. I am going 
to give you your first set of 
instructions so let’s get started. 
Slide 2 
Consent Form
• Before we can begin today’s session you need to read and 
sign a consent form which you will find in the folder in front 
of you
• You will notice that there are 2 consent forms in the folder 
and one of them is for you to take home so please place it 
in your bag now
• The consent form explains your rights as a research 
participant and, by signing it, you give your consent to 
participate in the study
• You need to sign the consent form on the last page and 
when you have done so please raise your hand
• Once everyone has signed their consent forms, we can 
continue
• If you have any questions please raise your hand and 
someone will come to answer them
• You may read through the consent form now
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Welcome
• Thank you for agreeing to take part in this 
study, your views and choices will be very 
informative and helpful
• Before we get started, I would like to explain 
how things are going to work
• Once that is done, we can begin with the tasks
• If you have any questions, please do not ask 
them out loud – raise your hand and someone 
will come over to you
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3 Tasks and a Questionnaire
• You will take part in 3 tasks and you will have 
the opportunity to earn money on the basis of 
the choices you (and other participants in 
today’s session) make
• We will determine your payment for the tasks 
once you have completed all of them
• Once you have completed all 3 tasks, you will 
need to fill out a short questionnaire
• We will then total up and pay you your cash 
earnings privately, as discussed in a moment
• Once this is done, you will be free to leave
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The First 2 Tasks
• You will complete two tasks now at the start of 
the session
• In each of these two tasks, you will make a set of 
decisions
• At the end of the session you will be randomly 
and anonymously paired up with another person 
in the room
• One of the decisions from one of these first two 
tasks will then be randomly selected to 
determine your payment on the basis of the 
choices that you and your partner made
• You will be given detailed instructions on the 
tasks before you complete them
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Task 3
• After completing the first two tasks you will 
complete Task 3, which is an individual 
decision-making task
• You will need to choose between lotteries 
with varying prizes and chances of winning
• You will make 100 of these choices
• When you are finished making these choices 
we will randomly select one of them to 
determine your payment
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Earnings
• You will be paid R40 just for participating in 
today’s session
• Once you have finished all three tasks we will 
determine your payments for them
• This money will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the session today, in private
• To determine your earnings for Task 3, we will 
ask you to roll some dice
• Let’s go through a quick explanation of the 
dice you will roll
 
 
Slide 8 10-sided dice
• At the end of Task 3 we will ask you to roll some dice into a plastic 
bowl which you can see below
• Two of the dice that you will roll are 10-sided dice and these are 
used to select a number between 1 and 100
• Every number between 1 and 100, and including 1 and 100, is 
equally likely to occur
• An example of a dice roll is shown below
 
 
Slide 9 10-sided dice
• Let’s look at a close-up of the 10-sided dice
• As you can see, one of the 10-sided dice has sides which increase in 
multiples of 10: 00, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90
• The other 10-sided dice has sides which increase in multiples of 1: 0, 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9
• You will roll the two 10-sided dice together and add the numbers on the 
two dice to select a number between 1 and 100
• In the example below, the number that was rolled is 86 (80 + 6)
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10-sided dice
• To tell the difference between a 6 and a 9 there is a dot at 
the base of the number
• This is why the number in the picture below is a 6: there is 
a dot at the base of the 6
• 9 looks different because there is a dot at the base of the 9
• The new picture below shows you what a 9 looks like
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10-sided dice
• To roll a number between 1 and 9 you need to roll 00 and a single 
number between 1 and 9
• As you can see in the picture below, the number that was rolled is 5 
(00 + 5)
• In the case where you roll 00 and 0, this will be treated as 100
• As you can see in the new picture below, the number that was 
rolled is 100 (00 and 0)
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The Tasks
• We have now finished the introductory 
explanation
• You will find instructions for the first task that 
you need to complete on top of the folder in 
front of you
• Please read through them and when you are 
finished raise your hand so that a research 
assistant can play a video for you which 
provides further details on the task
• When this is finished you will begin the first 
task
 
You can now read all three 
pages of the instructions for the 
first task, which are in front of 
you. 
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B2: Written Instructions 
B2.1: Investment Game 
Task Instructions 
 
This is a task where the decisions that you and another person make will determine the amounts 
of money that each of you earn. In this task, there are two roles, which we can refer to as Player 
1 and Player 2. You will be asked to make decisions in each of these roles: as Player 1 and as 
Player 2.  
 
At the end of the session today, you will be randomly and anonymously paired up with another 
person in the room. If this task is selected for payment, you and your partner will be randomly 
assigned to one of the two roles: either you are Player 1 and your partner is Player 2, or you are 
Player 2 and your partner is Player 1. Once these roles have been randomly assigned, a choice 
that you and your partner made will determine the earnings that each of you receive. 
 
The task works as follows: Player 1 and Player 2 are both given R100. Player 1 needs to decide 
how much of the R100 (if any) to send to Player 2. Player 1 can send amounts in R20 
increments: R0, R20, R40, R60, R80, or R100. The amount that Player 1 sends is automatically 
tripled before it is received by Player 2. So, if Player 1 sends R40 then Player 2 receives R120. 
Player 2 then decides how much of the R120 (if any) to send back to Player 1 and, therefore, 
how much to keep for himself/herself. Player 2 can send amounts in R20 increments. 
 
These decisions will be made on a computer. This is what the computer display will look like for 
Player 1: 
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As you can see, Player 1 has to choose whether to send R0, R20, R40, R60, R80, or R100 to 
Player 2, knowing that any amount that is sent will be tripled and received by Player 2. Player 1 
has to make this decision 5 times, on 5 separate computer screens. As any of these 5 choices 
could be randomly selected for payment, you should approach each choice as if it is the one that 
you will be paid for. 
 
Now, when you are in the role of Player 2, you will not know how much money has been sent to 
you by Player 1 because we only randomly and anonymously pair up people at the end of the 
session today. So, you will choose how much to send back to Player 1 for every possible amount 
that Player 1 can send you, except if Player 1 sends R0 because then there is nothing for you to 
send back.  
 
So, you will decide how much to send back to Player 1 for every possible amount Player 1 can 
send: 
• If Player 1 sends R20, which is then tripled and becomes R60 
• If Player 1 sends R40, which is then tripled and becomes R120 
• If Player 1 sends R60, which is then tripled and becomes R180 
• If Player 1 sends R80, which is then tripled and becomes R240 
• If Player 1 sends R100, which is then tripled and becomes R300  
 
This is what the computer display will look like for Player 2: 
 
 
Once you have made your choices in the roles of Player 1 and Player 2 you will move on to the 
next task. At the end of the session today, we will determine your earnings for the first 2 tasks in 
the following way:  
• You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in the room 
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• One of the first 2 tasks in today’s session will then be randomly selected for payment 
• If this task is randomly selected for payment, you and your partner will be randomly assigned 
to one of the two roles: either you are Player 1 and your partner is Player 2, or you are Player 
2 and your partner is Player 1.  
• Once these roles have been randomly assigned, one of the choices Player 1 made will be 
randomly selected  
• Given the amount sent by Player 1, the amount that Player 2 chose to send back to Player 1 
will determine the earnings that each of you receive 
 
For example, suppose that you are randomly selected as Player 1. One of the 5 choices you made 
in this role will be randomly selected to determine payment. Suppose you chose to send R60 to 
Player 2. This amount is tripled so that Player 2 receives R180. Player 2 would have chosen what 
amount to send back to Player 1 for every possible amount that Player 1 could send. Suppose 
that when Player 1 sends R60, which is tripled to become R180, Player 2 chose to send R100 
back to Player 1. Then, as Player 1, you earn the R100 that you were given at the start, minus the 
R60 you sent to Player 2, plus the R100 that Player 2 returned to you = R100 – R60 + R100 = 
R140. Player 2 earns the R100 that he/she was given at the start, plus the R180 that you sent, 
minus the R100 that Player 2 sent back to you = R100 + R180 – R100 = R180. 
 
As another example, suppose that you are randomly selected as Player 2 and that Player 1 chose 
to send R20. This amount is tripled so that you receive R60. You would have chosen what to 
send back to Player 1 if Player 1 sends R20. Assume that you chose to send back R20 out of the 
R60 you received. Then you, as Player 2, earn the R100 that you were given at the start, plus the 
R60 you received from Player 1, minus the R20 that you sent back = R100 + R60 – R20 = R140. 
Player 1 earns the R100 that he/she was given at the start, minus the R20 that was sent to you, 
plus the R20 that you sent back to Player 1 = R100 – R20 + R20 = R100. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers in this task. Please work silently and make your choices by 
thinking carefully about the different options. When you have finished the task, please raise your 
hand and a research assistant will come to you to prepare you for the next task. 
 
Please raise your hand now. 
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B2.2: Dictator Game 
Task Instructions 
 
This is a task where the decisions that either you or another person make will determine the 
amounts of money that each of you earn. In this task, there are two roles, which we can refer to 
as Player 1 and Player 2. Player 2 is a passive player and does not have any choices to make. 
Player 1, on the other hand, has to make choices and these choices will determine the amounts 
of money that Player 1 and Player 2 earn. 
 
At the end of the session today, you will be randomly and anonymously paired up with another 
person in the room. If this task is selected for payment, you and your partner will be randomly 
assigned to one of the two roles: either you are Player 1 and your partner is Player 2, or you are 
Player 2 and your partner is Player 1. Once these roles have been randomly assigned, a choice 
that you or your partner made will determine the earnings that each of you receive. 
 
The task works as follows: Player 1 is given an amount of money, e.g., R100. Player 1 needs to 
decide how much of this amount (if any) to send to Player 2. Player 1 can send amounts in R10 
increments: R0, R10, R20, R30, R40, R50, R60, R70, R80, R90, or R100. The money that is sent 
is then multiplied by a number, e.g., 3, before it is received by Player 2. After Player 2 has 
received the amount sent by Player 1, the task ends. 
 
Player 1 needs to make 5 of these decisions on 5 separate computer screens. While the basic 
structure of the task is the same for each decision, some of the details change across the 
decisions. For example, for one of the decisions, Player 1 will be given R100 and Player 2 will 
also be given R100. For another decision, Player 1 will be given R80 and Player 2 will be given 
R0. Thus, the amounts that Player 1 and Player 2 are given differs across the decisions.  
 
In addition, the money that Player 1 sends to Player 2 will be multiplied by different numbers for 
different decisions. For example, for one of the decisions, any money that Player 1 sends will be 
multiplied by 3 before it is received by Player 2 (i.e., the multiplier is 3). So, if Player 1 sends R10 
then Player 2 will receive R30. For another decision, any money that Player 1 sends will be 
multiplied by 1 before it is received by Player 2 (i.e., the multiplier is 1). So, if Player 1 sends R40, 
then Player 2 receives R40 in this case. Finally, for another decision, any money that Player 1 
sends will be multiplied by 5 before it is received by Player 2 (i.e., the multiplier is 5). So, if Player 
1 sends R20 then Player 2 receives R100. 
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This is what the computer display will look like: 
 
Once you have made your choices as Player 1 you will move on to the next task. At the end of 
the session today, we will determine your earnings for the first 2 tasks in the following way:  
• You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in the room 
• One of the first 2 tasks in today’s session will then be randomly selected for payment  
• If this task is randomly selected for payment, you and your partner will be randomly assigned 
to one of the two roles: either you are Player 1 and your partner is Player 2, or you are Player 
2 and your partner is Player 1.  
• Once these roles have been randomly assigned, one of the choices that Player 1 made will be 
randomly selected to determine the earnings that each of you receive. 
 
Note that as any of the 5 choices that you make as Player 1 could be randomly selected for 
payment, you should approach each choice as if it is the one that you will be paid for. In 
addition, please pay careful attention to the information that is provided on every screen because 
the amounts of money that Player 1 and Player 2 are given and the amount by which sent money 
is multiplied changes across the screens. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers in this task. Please work silently and make your choices by 
thinking carefully about the different options, particularly because they vary across the different 
decisions. When you have finished the task, please raise your hand and a research assistant will 
come to you to prepare you for the next task. 
 
Please raise your hand now.  
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B2.3: Risk Preference Task 
Task Instructions 
 
This is a task where you will choose between lotteries with varying prizes and chances of 
winning. On each computer screen you will be presented with a pair of lotteries and you will 
need to choose one of them. There are 100 pairs of lotteries in this task. For each pair of 
lotteries, you should choose the lottery you would prefer to play. You will actually get the chance 
to play one of the lotteries you choose, and you will be paid according to the outcome of that 
lottery, so you should think carefully about which lottery you prefer. Note that this is an 
individual decision-making task so you are not paired with anyone else. 
 
Here is an example of what the computer display of a pair of lotteries might look like: 
 
The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by rolling a regular 6-sided dice. And you will 
get to roll this 6-sided dice yourself at the end of the session today. 
 
In the above example, Lottery A pays R180 with a 4-in-6 chance and R580 with a 2-in-6 chance. 
So when you roll the 6-sided dice, if it lands on 1, 2, 3 or 4 you will be paid R180, and if it lands 
on 5 or 6 you will be paid R580. The green colour in the pie chart corresponds to 4/6 of the area 
and illustrates the chance that the dice lands on 1, 2, 3 or 4 and your prize is R180. The blue 
colour in the pie chart corresponds to 2/6 of the area and illustrates the chance that the dice 
lands on 5 or 6 and your prize is R580. 
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Now look at Lottery B in the example. It pays R80 with a 3-in-6 chance, and R580 with a 3-in-6 
chance. So when you roll the 6-sided dice, if it lands on 1, 2 or 3 you will be paid R80, and if it 
lands on 4, 5 or 6 you will be paid R580. The red colour in the pie chart corresponds to 3/6 of 
the area and illustrates the chance that the dice lands on 1, 2 or 3 and your prize is R80. The blue 
colour in the pie chart corresponds to 3/6 of the area and illustrates the chance that the dice 
lands on 4, 5 or 6 and your prize is R580. 
 
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a new screen on the computer. On each screen, you should 
indicate which lottery you would prefer to play by clicking on the pie chart that represents the 
lottery. You will then click the “Submit” button to move on to the next screen with a new set of 
lotteries. 
 
After you have worked through all of the 100 pairs of lotteries, raise your hand and a research 
assistant will come to you to determine your payment for this task. You will roll two 10-sided 
dice to pick a number between 1 and 100 to determine which pair of lotteries will be played out. 
Since there is a chance that any of your 100 choices could be played out for real, you should 
approach each pair of lotteries as if it is the one that you will play out.  
  
Therefore, your earnings for this task are determined by three things: 
 
• by which lottery you selected, Lottery A or Lottery B, for each of the 100 pairs; 
• by which lottery pair is chosen to be played out in the set of 100 pairs using the two 10-sided 
dice; and  
• by the outcome of that lottery when you roll the regular 6-sided dice. 
 
Which lotteries you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you may be presented 
with different lotteries, and may have different preferences, so their responses should not matter 
to you. Please work silently and make your choices by thinking carefully about each lottery. 
 
Payment for this task is in cash and is in addition to the R40 show-up fee that you receive just 
for being here. When you have finished the task, please raise your hand and a research assistant 
will come to you to determine your payment for this task and for the first two tasks that you 
completed. 
 
 
Please raise your hand now. 
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Figure C.1: Histograms for Distribution of all Five Send Decisions in IG, by Task Order 
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Table D.1: Risk-Trust Confound Estimates for First Amount Sent in IG 
 Fractional Response Tobit OLS 
  Estimate (Std error) Estimate (Std error) Estimate (Std error) 
Number of risky choices  0.000  -0.030  0.283 
  (0.001)  (0.144)  (0.482) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.004***  0.569***  0.428*** 
  (0.001)  (0.088)  (0.066) 
Age  -0.022***  -2.667***  -2.093*** 
  (0.006)  (0.831)  (0.660) 
White  -0.017  -2.632  -1.703 
  (0.054)  (6.279)  (4.875) 
Female  -0.077**  -8.737*  -7.632** 
  (0.035)  (4.461)  (3.525) 
Information treatment  0.152***  19.802***  15.339*** 
  (0.039)  (5.113)  (4.029) 
Task order 2  -0.095**  -11.911*  -9.705* 
  (0.047)  (6.742)  (5.361) 
Task order 3  0.016  1.861  1.359 
  (0.055)  (7.417)  (5.871) 
Task order 4  -0.046  -5.434  -4.813 
  (0.052)  (6.643)  (5.241) 
Number of risky choices squared    -0.003 
    (0.005) 
Constant    79.579*** 
    (20.811) 
N  277  277  277 
Marginal effects reported    
Standard errors in parentheses    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
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Table D.2: Risk-Trust Confound Estimates for Average Amount Sent in IG 
 Fractional Response Tobit OLS 
  Estimate (Std error) Estimate (Std error) Estimate (Std error) 
Number of risky choices  0.000  0.031  0.039 
  (0.001)  (0.104)  (0.405) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.004***  0.484***  0.412*** 
  (0.001)  (0.063)  (0.056) 
Age  -0.014***  -1.662***  -1.411** 
  (0.005)  (0.604)  (0.555) 
White  -0.007  -0.438  -0.817 
  (0.047)  (4.512)  (4.098) 
Female  -0.082***  -8.915***  -8.111*** 
  (0.030)  (3.231)  (2.963) 
Information treatment  0.110***  12.254***  11.164*** 
  (0.033)  (3.701)  (3.387) 
Task order 2  -0.091**  -8.919*  -9.399** 
  (0.040)  (4.893)  (4.507) 
Task order 3  0.000  1.113  -0.218 
  (0.046)  (5.371)  (4.936) 
Task order 4  -0.044  -3.249  -4.697 
  (0.042)  (4.802)  (4.406) 
Number of risky choices squared    0.000 
    (0.004) 
Constant    74.103*** 
    (17.495) 
N  277  277  277 
Marginal effects reported    
Standard errors in parentheses    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table E.1: Expected Utility ML Estimates for all Five Send Decisions in IG 
Heterogenous Preferences 
  Estimate (Std error) 
Power function parameter (r)  
Amounts Sent in 5 IG choices  0.000 
  (0.003) 
Amounts Sent in 5 IG choices squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.011*** 
  (0.004) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  -0.000** 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.027 
  (0.022) 
White  0.090 
  (0.110) 
Female  -0.215** 
  (0.097) 
Information treatment  0.049 
  (0.068) 
Task order 2  0.004 
  (0.080) 
Task order 3  -0.064 
  (0.119) 
Task order 4  -0.161 
  (0.120) 
Constant  0.124 
   (0.481) 
Noise  
Error (μ)  0.150*** 
  (0.005) 
N  138500 
log-likelihood  -78865.473 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table E.2: Expected Utility ML Estimates for Average Amount Sent in IG 
 Heterogenous Preferences 
  Estimate (Std error) 
Power function parameter (r)  
Average Amount Sent in IG  0.001 
  (0.008) 
Average Amount Sent in IG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.010** 
  (0.005) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.026 
  (0.023) 
White  0.092 
  (0.112) 
Female  -0.219** 
  (0.101) 
Information treatment  0.047 
  (0.072) 
Task order 2  0.001 
  (0.085) 
Task order 3  -0.070 
  (0.127) 
Task order 4  -0.160 
  (0.123) 
Constant  0.086 
   (0.543) 
Noise  
Error (μ)  0.150*** 
  (0.005) 
N  27700 
log-likelihood  -15772.677 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table F.1: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for First Amount Sent in IG 
Heterogenous Preferences 
  Estimate (Std error) 
Power function parameter (r)  
First Amount Sent in IG  0.002 
  (0.004) 
First Amount Sent in IG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.006 
  (0.004) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.022** 
  (0.009) 
White  0.226*** 
  (0.074) 
Female  -0.272*** 
  (0.082) 
Information treatment  0.004 
  (0.095) 
Task order 2  0.071 
  (0.114) 
Task order 3  0.087* 
  (0.048) 
Task order 4  0.005 
  (0.109) 
Constant  0.008 
  (0.230) 
Table continues on the next page  
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Table F.1: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for First Amount Sent in IG (continued) 
  Estimate (Std error) 
PWF Parameter (ϕ)   
First Amount Sent in IG  0.006 
  (0.004) 
First Amount Sent in IG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.007* 
  (0.004) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  0.005 
  (0.024) 
White  0.138 
  (0.096) 
Female  0.048 
  (0.084) 
Information treatment  -0.010 
  (0.093) 
Task order 2  -0.109 
  (0.133) 
Task order 3  -0.311** 
  (0.145) 
Task order 4  -0.167 
  (0.124) 
Constant  0.837 
   (0.570) 
Table continues on next page  
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Table F.1: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for First Amount Sent in IG (continued) 
 Estimate (Std error) 
PWF Parameter (η)  
First Amount Sent in IG  -0.003 
  (0.004) 
First Amount Sent in IG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  -0.002 
  (0.003) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  0.004 
  (0.017) 
White  0.110 
  (0.093) 
Female  0.001 
  (0.058) 
Information treatment  -0.020 
  (0.072) 
Task order 2  0.049 
  (0.093) 
Task order 3  0.037 
  (0.097) 
Task order 4  0.090 
  (0.092) 
Constant  0.967*** 
   (0.374) 
Noise  
Error (μ)  0.149*** 
  (0.005) 
N  27700 
log-likelihood  -15688.956 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table F.2: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for all Five Send Decisions in IG 
Heterogenous Preferences 
  Estimate (Std error) 
Power function parameter (r)  
Amounts Sent in 5 IG choices  -0.003* 
  (0.002) 
Amounts Sent in 5 IG choices squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.003 
  (0.004) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.034*** 
  (0.010) 
White  0.214*** 
  (0.066) 
Female  -0.298*** 
  (0.083) 
Information treatment  0.012 
  (0.102) 
Task order 2  0.044 
  (0.098) 
Task order 3  -0.021 
  (0.044) 
Task order 4  -0.079* 
  (0.046) 
Constant  0.459** 
  (0.220) 
 Table continues on next page  
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Table F.2: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for all Five Send Decisions in IG 
(continued) 
 Estimate (Std error) 
PWF Parameter (ϕ)  
Amounts Sent in 5 IG choices  0.003 
  (0.003) 
Amounts Sent in 5 IG choices squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.008** 
  (0.004) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  -0.000* 
  (0.000) 
Age  0.005 
  (0.020) 
White  0.117 
  (0.094) 
Female  0.058 
  (0.085) 
Information treatment  -0.009 
  (0.089) 
Task order 2  -0.103 
  (0.134) 
Task order 3  -0.299** 
  (0.147) 
Task order 4  -0.177 
  (0.126) 
Constant  0.876* 
   (0.456) 
Table continues on next page  
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Table F.2: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for all Five Send Decisions in IG 
(continued) 
 Estimate (Std error) 
PWF Parameter (η)  
Amounts Sent in 5 IG choices  -0.002 
  (0.002) 
Amounts Sent in 5 IG choices squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  -0.005 
  (0.003) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.002 
  (0.015) 
White  0.125 
  (0.092) 
Female  -0.020 
  (0.060) 
Information treatment  -0.007 
  (0.069) 
Task order 2  0.028 
  (0.092) 
Task order 3  -0.016 
  (0.101) 
Task order 4  0.064 
  (0.095) 
Constant  1.118*** 
   (0.336) 
Noise  
Error (μ)  0.149*** 
  (0.005) 
N  138500 
log-likelihood  -78528.906 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table F.3: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for Average Amount Sent in IG 
Heterogenous Preferences 
  Estimate (Std error) 
Power function parameter (r)   
Average Amount Sent in IG  -0.002 
  (0.005) 
Average Amount Sent in IG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.004 
  (0.005) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.013 
  (0.027) 
White  0.170* 
  (0.100) 
Female  -0.278*** 
  (0.091) 
Information treatment  -0.005 
  (0.118) 
Task order 2  0.075 
  (0.132) 
Task order 3  -0.034 
  (0.121) 
Task order 4  -0.037 
  (0.128) 
Constant  -0.045 
   (0.604) 
Table continues on next page  
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Table F.3: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for Average Amount Sent in IG 
(continued) 
 Estimate (Std error) 
PWF Parameter (ϕ)  
Average Amount Sent in IG  0.005 
  (0.005) 
Average Amount Sent in IG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  0.007* 
  (0.004) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.002 
  (0.019) 
White  0.148 
  (0.100) 
Female  0.039 
  (0.088) 
Information treatment  0.003 
  (0.092) 
Task order 2  -0.110 
  (0.134) 
Task order 3  -0.299** 
  (0.146) 
Task order 4  -0.177 
  (0.127) 
Constant  0.991** 
   (0.471) 
Table continues on next page  
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Table F.3: Rank-Dependent Utility ML Estimates for Average Amount Sent in IG 
(continued) 
 Estimate (Std error) 
PWF Parameter (η)  
Average Amount Sent in IG  -0.001 
  (0.004) 
Average Amount Sent in IG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount Sent in DG  -0.004 
  (0.003) 
Amount Sent in DG squared  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Age  0.009 
  (0.015) 
White  0.105 
  (0.086) 
Female  -0.016 
  (0.063) 
Information treatment  -0.012 
  (0.070) 
Task order 2  0.037 
  (0.089) 
Task order 3  -0.022 
  (0.091) 
Task order 4  0.080 
  (0.092) 
Constant  0.887*** 
   (0.343) 
Noise  
Error (μ)  0.149*** 
  (0.005) 
N  27700 
log-likelihood  -15693.331 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
